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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to explain the choice of capital structure in the times of crisis (2007-2009) for 
the U.S.A. real sector companies. The two main theories used are the trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory. The essential of the pecking order theory is that manager‟s capital 
structure decisions are influenced by the market perceptions of managers‟ superior 
information. The trade-off theory provides support for manager‟s trade off between benefits 
and costs of debt. The conventional model is also used in the analysis in order to increase the 
robustness of the results. We find that the dynamic partial-adjustment model of the trade-off 
theory seems to explain better the choice of capital structure in the analyzed period than 
pecking order theory.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has been called the worst financial crisis since the one 
related to the Great Depression by leading economists (Reuters, February 27, 2009) , and it 
contributed to the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth and a significant 
decline in economic activity (Brookings, June 2009). The financial crisis began in 2007 on the 
US mortgage market. During the autumn of 2008 it developed into a global liquidity crisis. 
The functioning of many credit markets seriously deteriorated and in some cases the markets 
practically stopped to function at all. The banks, for example, found it very difficult to issue 
securities at longer maturities. The countermeasures of the central banks have largely aimed at 
securing the banks‟ supply of liquidity (Monetary Policy Report, February 2009). The 
reluctance of banks to lend, even amongst each other, froze the credit markets, making it 
difficult for corporations and individuals, even those with a consistent track record of 
repayment or strong credit scores, to use debt to finance purchases of everything from 
equipment to auto loans (Associated Press, June 2007).  
Given the conditions stated above, it can be easily deduced that corporations during liquidity 
crisis face a lot of problems concerning their activity (financial, operational, investment) 
which is affecting their choice of capital structure. The purpose of this Master Thesis is to 
explain the composition of corporate capital structure and choice of financing decisions in 
times of the current crisis. This will be done with the help of the primary existing theories of 
corporate capital structure explaining firms‟ financing decisions that can be categorized as the 
trade-off and pecking order theories. 
The Pecking Order model states that firms prefer internal equity (i.e. retained equity) to 
external financing, but in the event of external financing debt is preferred to equity. Therefore 
debt ratios are the result of cumulative financing decisions over time as opposed to moving 
closer to a long run target. Hence financial deficits are the driving force behind debt issues. 
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Pecking Order hypothesis‟s predictions about leverage are that debt typically grows when 
investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings 
as opposed to a more complex view of the model. Fama and French (2002) have tested some 
qualitative predictions of the pecking order theory against the qualitative predictions of the 
Trade-Off model. In their findings suggest that more profitable firms are less levered and it is 
consistent with the Pecking Order.  Also according to this theory, firms do not have a strong 
incentive to rebalance their capital structures. It suggests a very slow adjustment speed 
towards a target debt ratio. 
The Static Trade-Off Model predicts an optimal level of debt as a result of trade-offs between 
tax advantages from interest and costs of financial distress (bankruptcy). Empirically this 
suggests mean reverting behaviour from actual debt ratios towards the optimum assuming that 
target debt ratios are constant. Also Fama and French (2002) in their paper show that the firms 
with greater investment opportunities and corresponding higher profitability are more levered 
as predicted by the Trade-Off theory. In the trade-off theory, firms select target leverage ratios 
based on an exchange between the benefits and costs of increased leverage (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1963, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, Stulz, 1990, Hart and Moore, 1995, 
and Ross, 1977). In the absence of any adjustment cost, firms would continuously offset 
deviations from target. The presence of large adjustment costs would likely slow down the 
adjustment time. These are the classical assumptions concerning POT and STOT, but the 
decisions concerning corporate structure are not driven only by the theory, they are influenced 
by the current market conditions and the existing trends in the world economy.  
Before the current crisis business investment was highly dependent on debt, now the credit 
condition is tightened and is very difficult to obtain a loan.  New loans to large borrowers fell 
by 36% during the peak period of the financial crisis (August-October 2008) relative to the 
prior three-month period and by 60% relative to the peak of the credit boom (May-July 2007). 
New lending for real investment (such as capital expenditures) fell to the same extent as new 
lending for restructuring (Ivashina and Scharfstein, November 5, 2008). 
Also during the current period the world's financial markets are experiencing an enormous 
deleveraging that has crippled the global economy making enormous amounts of money 
virtually evaporate. It is the first time in history that this phenomenon of deleveraging has 
become so massive and its effects - already apparent in almost all the financial sectors- are 
expected to create long lasting problems (Enzine articles, November 9, 2008). At the same 
time with deleveraging the companies are retaining the liquidity, fact that reduces the 
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availability of funds to real economy and slows down the economic development. Having 
these conditions is interesting to see how the real sector U.S. companies make their capital 
structure and financing decisions. 
 Accordingly, there can be formulated a set of hypothesis concerning the choice of capital 
structure which are tested. 
 Leverage of the firms will decrease in time of current crisis. 
 In the time of current crisis any deficit that companies have is financed less by debt 
issuance. 
 Firms in the crisis are adjusting to a target debt level in order to achieve an optimal 
capital structure. 
 The debt and profitability are expected to be inversely related.  
I start the analysis of firm‟s capital structure by investigating the level of debt and its 
evolution during the analyzed period of time. In his paper Bris et. al. (2004), shows that the 
leverage increases prior to a crisis and continues to increase after the crisis. These results are 
not consistent with this study, which registers a decrease in the level of debt after the economy 
is hit by a crisis. Kim and Stone (1999) find out that highly leveraged firms facing a cut-off of 
capital inflows are threatened by bankruptcy. These firms respond by eliminating investment 
and selling their capital goods at a discount to try to stay afloat. The results of their study are 
consistent with the current situation and empirical evidence from our research in which is 
registered a decrease in the amount of assets owned by companies. 
Having these results, I use then the pecking order theory and trade-off theory, which are 
testing if traditional capital structure theories are able to empirically explain the composition 
of corporate capital structure. The pecking order theory of capital structure is among the most 
influential theories of corporate leverage. In this paper, I study the extent to which the pecking 
order theory of capital structure provides a satisfactory account of the financing behaviour of 
publicly traded American firms over the 2007-2009 periods. The test is based on the idea that 
if firms follow the pecking order, then in a regression of net debt issues on the financing 
deficit, a slope coefficient of one is observed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find strong 
support for this prediction in a sample of 157 firms that had traded continuously over the 
period 1971 to 1989. While Goyal and Frank (2002) in their study show that evidence does not 
support this hypothesis. 
In testing the trade-off theory, the selection of studies is based on Myers‟ (1984) insight, that 
the key question to differentiate between competing capital structure theories is whether firms 
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adjust to some target following shocks to their capital structure. This is due to the fact, that 
trade-off theories suggest that firms try to maintain some “optimal” debt ratio. 
Respectively, I discuss the study by Welch (2004), who examines adjustment behaviour 
following shocks to the market-value based debt ratio due to changes in the equity value of 
companies, the study by Flannery/Rangan (2006), which takes dynamic adjustment behaviour 
of firms explicitly into account in the design of the empirical model. The most important 
objective of capital structure study using dynamic partial adjustment models is to approximate 
the speed of adjustment. Flannery and Rangan (2006) investigate whether United States firms 
really have long-run target capital structures and if they do, then how quick they adjust to this 
target. I complement the empirical models of studies on firms‟ adjustment behaviour to capital 
structure shocks by adding additional factors that may influence capital structure decisions, 
but have gained only recently attention in the literature. For instance, Kisgen (2006) considers 
for the first time the role of ratings from external rating agencies (like S&P or Moody‟s) in the 
capital structure context. This seems an important contribution due to the eminent role that 
rating agencies play in capital markets nowadays. Also I consider the effect of expected 
inflation and industry median debt on the speed of adjustment of capital structure. 
I briefly address studies that focus on shocks from macroeconomic factors and the 
competitive and regulatory environment. With their help I make an extension of the partial-
adjustment model by including the effect of macroeconomic determinants. As macroeconomic 
determinants serve term spread, default spread, growth rate of GDP and price-output ratio, 
which were first used by Korajczyk and Levy in 2003. 
Even when a theory is not correct, it still can do a better job in organizing the evidence, when 
compared to other theories. The pecking order is a rival to other majority of empirical models 
of corporate leverage. Main empirical alternatives such as the model tested by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) uses other information set to report for corporate leverage. For that reason it 
is of interest to see how the financing deficit performs in a nested model that also 
encompasses conventional factors. The financing deficit ought to wipe out the effects of other 
variables according to the pecking order theory. If the financing deficit is simply one factor 
among many that firms trade-off, then what is left is a generalized version of the trade-off 
theory. The current study finds that the financing deficit does not wipe out the effects of 
conventional variables. The information in the financing deficit appears to be factored in 
along with many other things that firms take in consideration. This is true across firm sizes 
and across time periods. 
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The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. The second chapter includes the 
theoretical framework which is divided in three parts. In the first part the general 
characteristics and key macroeconomic determinants of the recent crisis are discussed. We 
start analyze with the beginning of financial crisis, in 2007 on the US mortgage market, and 
its development during the autumn of 2008 into a global liquidity crisis. In the second part 
there is a review of the main capital structure theories, such as: Modigliani and Miller theory, 
Static Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory. The third part contains empirical 
evidence concerning the tested hypothesis and a general motivation of those hypotheses. In 
the third chapter is presented the methodology, are defined data and variables, testable models 
and assumptions. The forth chapter includes the empirical findings of the study. There is also 
an analysis of these findings and their correspondence with the stated theories of capital 
structure in the times of crisis. Finally, conclusion is presented in the fifth section. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
 
 
 
2.1 Institutional Setting of the Current Crisis 
 The current crisis has begun from the real estate and the subprime lending crisis. The values 
of commercial and residential properties were increase sharply in a real estate boom that 
began in the 1990s and increased continuous for almost a decade. The United States housing 
boom peaked in approximately 2005–2006 and high default rates on subprime and adjustable 
rate mortgages, began to increase quickly thereafter (Lahart Justin, June 2008). 
In the years before the start of the crisis in 2007, significant amounts of foreign money flowed 
into the U.S. from fast-growing economies in Asia and oil-producing countries. This inflow of 
funds made it easier for the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates in the United States too low 
which contributed to easy credit conditions, leading to the United States housing bubble. An 
increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend of rising housing 
prices had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief they would be 
able to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise 
and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S., 
refinancing became more difficult (New York Times, September 24 2008). Foreclosure and 
default activity increased dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go 
up as anticipated, and adjustable rate mortgages interest rates went higher. 
 Increases in housing prices coincided with a period of government deregulation that not only 
allowed unqualified buyers to take out mortgages but also helped erase the lines between 
traditional investment banks and mortgage lenders. Real estate loans were spread all the way 
through the financial system in the form of CDOs and other complex derivatives in order to 
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dissolve risk; however, when home values failed to rise and home owners failed to keep up 
with their payments, banks were forced to acknowledge huge write downs and write offs on 
these products. These huge write downs found several institutions at the edge of insolvency 
with many being required to raise capital or go bankrupt (Investment Education, September 
2009).  
In 2008, a series of bank and insurance company failures triggered a financial crisis that 
effectively halted global credit markets and required extraordinary government intervention. 
Global equity markets have declined sharply, banks and government-sponsoring housing 
enterprises have either failed or have been bailed out (Bear Stearns in March, Freddie 
Mac/Fannie Mae in September, among others), several banks were taken over (Merrill Lynch 
by Bank of America, Washington Mutual by JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia by Wells Fargo), as 
well as five European Banks, one large investment bank has gone bankrupt (Lehman Brothers 
in September), and the remaining two of the former Big Five US investment banks  converted 
into traditional commercial banks (RASG, December 2008). On top of that some commodity 
prices spiked and then drooped as crude oil reached a very high value of USD 147 per barrel 
in July 2008 and then went down to USD 50 in November 2008(RASG, December 2008). 
These failures caused a crisis of confidence that made banks reluctant to lend money amongst 
themselves, or for that matter, to anyone. 
The central banks intervened swiftly and aggressively by providing various liquidity facilities 
and heavy cuts in interest rates (figure 1). In addition, policy makers tried to calm markets 
with various initiatives, such as TARP (troubled asset relief program) in the US. In order to 
help to revive the economy the central banks around the world have cut the interest rates to 
low levels. These cuts did not have their normal effect, due to the credit crunch. For most 
companies (and consumers) credit is more expensive than before. While many of the current 
problems were initially apparent in the residential housing sector, commercial real estate, auto 
loans, credit card debt, etc. become soon also under pressure. 
Since the credit crunch started in summer 2007 financial institutions have been selling their 
assets to reduce their balance sheets, thus reversing the long-term trend of credit creation. 
Before the current crisis, leverage largely increased across the economy. For example, total 
debt in the United States increased from $20,7 trillion to $31,7 trillion, or by nearly 53 
percent, from year-end 2002 to year-end 2007, and the ratio of total debt to gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased from 1,96 to  2,26 , or by 15 percent, during the same period (GAO, 
July 2009). All this happened as a result of the fact that consumers were encouraged to 
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borrow in an environment of low unemployment, declining interest rates and rising asset 
prices. 
 
Figure 1. Central banks reduce interest rate in unison. 
                   
Source: FED (Michal Mejstrik, Banking Lecture Notes, fall 2009). 
 
The most import development in the state of the banking crisis was the transmission of that 
crisis to the rest of the economy and its interaction with the more general economic crisis 
which was emerging. The most obvious issue here is the beginning of recession. The essential 
reason for the recession was the dependence of consumer demand in particular but also 
business investment on high levels of debt over the last two decades. When lending was 
contracting this debt-sustained expansion was no longer possible and a sharp economic 
slowdown looked inevitable. The fall in house prices was also worsening the slowdown in 
consumer spending as households and firms were no longer able to borrow against rising 
equity values. 
There are two fundamental reasons for the reliance on debt. Consumption has come to depend 
on debt because of the contradiction between driving wages down to generate profits in 
production and needing to ensure demand in order to sell the goods produced and realize these 
profits. The most obvious manifestation of this is growing income inequality and it is no 
accident that the build-up of debt has been worst in countries with the greatest disparity in 
incomes, notably the UK and USA (R. Wade, September-October 2008). 
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In this way the production in general, but especially investment, has come to rely on debt as a 
result of the weakness of profitability in the productive sector. As a result, without debt being 
available to fund expansion recession appeared inevitable. The government response to the 
recession has been firstly to increase their own borrowing and secondly to encourage central 
banks to cut interest rates. But both of these create their own problems. Government 
borrowing is limited by the cost of the bank bail-outs. High levels of borrowing can also push 
up interest rates or reduce currency values. Both of these effects lower firms and household 
real incomes and decrease spending provoking the original purpose of the borrowing 
(International Viewpoint, December 2008).  
In the current crisis only the most stable companies with the highest credit ratings have access 
to cash. Other firms are affected because their target consumers no longer have any 
discretionary income.  
Cutting interest rates is also difficult. Central banks only directly control short-term interest 
rates and private banks have simply refused to cut long-term rates in response to central bank 
policies. Cuts in interest rates also have the effect of lowering both the actual returns and the 
prospective returns both of which may lower consumption.  
More basically, the room for government policy to sustain the economy is limited and as long 
as spending and producing depends on debt and because new debt is not forthcoming, the 
slowdown will not be over passed so easily. 
Having presented the conditions and main characteristics of the current crisis now we will 
turn to the theories concerning the capital structure and the financing decisions of companies. 
 
2.2 Capital Structure Theories 
 
2.2.1 Introduction to Capital Structure Theories 
 
Capital structure is the combination of a company's long-term debt, specific short-term debt, 
common equity, and preferred equity; the capital structure is the firm's various sources of 
funds used to finance its overall operations and growth. Debt comes in the form of bond 
issues or long-term notes payable, whereas equity is classified as common stock, preferred 
stock, or retained earnings. Short-term debt such as working capital requirements also is 
considered part of the capital structure (The Free Dictionary by Farlex). 
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In analyzing a firm's capital structure the proportion of short-term and long-term debt is 
considered. As usual when someone refers to capital structure, most likely is talking about a 
firm's debt/equity ratio, which provides insight into how risky a company is. Usually a 
company financed heavily by debt poses greater risks because it is highly leveraged. 
As Brigham and Earhart (2002) states in their book, Financial Management, the capital 
structure is an important instrument where firms can maintain the control of a firm or lose it. 
Capital structure is also related with the bankruptcy risk that the creditors will face due to the 
proportion of capital provided by stockholders. By using more leverage shareholders can 
magnify their return (profitability) but if things go wrong the opposite situation would occur, 
which is the downside risk of having too much debt in the capital structure. Therefore, it is an 
important financial instrument that firms should consider carefully in their financial policies. 
A complex set of decisions creates the capital structure of a firm. Capital structure dictates the 
funding sources tapped by the company and allocates risks and control rights to various 
parties. Pursued wisely, the capital structure decisions should enhance value in financial 
markets. Key decisions include the overall mix of debt and equity, the forms, terms and 
maturity structure of debt, the allocation of voting control among equity classes, the timing of 
security issuance, and a host of issues regarding particular types of financial claims. 
In finance, capital structure refers to the way a corporation finances its assets through some 
combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities. A firm's capital structure is then the 
composition or 'structure' of its liabilities. The Modigliani-Miller theorem, proposed by 
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, forms the basis for modern thinking on capital 
structure, though it is generally viewed as a purely theoretical result since it assumes away 
many important factors in the capital structure decision.  
In what follows will be presented a couple of capital structure theories starting with the 
Modigliani Miller Theory. After that will be discussed Static Trade-Off Theory, Pecking Order 
Theory, and their views regarding capital structure and firm performance. 
 
2.2.2 Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem proposed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller forms the 
basis for modern thinking on capital structure, though it is generally viewed as a purely 
theoretical result since it assumes away many important factors in the capital structure 
decision. The theorem says that, in a perfect market, how a firm is financed is irrelevant to its 
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value (MIT Sloan Lecture Notes, 2003). Starting with this statement it is possible examine 
real world reasons why capital structure is relevant, or, why company's value is affected by 
the capital structure it employs. This might be for reasons that include bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs, taxes, information asymmetry and others. This analysis can then be extended to 
look at whether there is in fact an optimal capital structure: the one which maximizes the 
value of the firm. 
In a perfect capital market there is perfect information, no bankruptcy or transaction costs; 
firms and individuals can borrow at the same interest rate, taxes and investment decisions 
aren't affected by financing decisions. Modigliani and Miller made two findings under these 
conditions. Their first proposition was that the value of a company is independent of its 
capital structure. Their second proposition stated that the cost of equity for a leveraged firm is 
equal to the cost of equity for an unleveraged firm, plus an added premium for financial risk. 
That is, as leverage increases, while the burden of individual risks is shifted between different 
investor classes, total risk is conserved and hence no extra value created (Modigliani, F.; 
Miller, M. (1958). 
Their analysis was extended to include the effect of taxes and risky debt. Under a classical tax 
system the tax deductibility of interest makes debt financing valuable; that is, the cost of 
capital decreases as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases. The optimal 
structure then would be to have virtually no equity at all. 
 In his paper Stein Frynderberg (2004) presents several strict constraints that Modigliani and 
Miller assume in their original articles: 
 First, capital markets are assumed to be without transaction costs and there are no 
bankruptcy costs; 
 All firms are in the same risk class; 
 Corporate taxes are the only government burden; 
 No growth is allowed since all cash flows are perpetuities; 
 Firms issue only two types of claims, risk free debt and risky equity. All bonds (including 
any debts issued by households for the purpose of carrying stocks) are assumed to yield a 
constant income per unit of time, and the income is regarded as certain by all traders 
regardless of the issuer; 
 Information is symmetric across insider and outsider investors; 
 Managers are loyal stewards of owners and always maximize stockholders‟ wealth. 
If capital structure is irrelevant in a perfect market, then imperfections which exist in the real 
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world must be the cause of its relevance. The theories below try to address some of these 
imperfections, by relaxing assumptions made in the Miller and Modigliani model. 
 
2.2.3 Static Trade-Off Theory 
 
 The traditional approach is to present Modigliani and Miller‟s capital structure irrelevance 
hypothesis (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) and then build in the effects of taxes, financial 
distress, and agency costs until the model of optimal capital structure emerges. This is called 
the “Trade-Off Model” that is easily understood under the basic tendency of optimizing value 
- and thus shareholder wealth - by choosing a capital structure combination which gives  the 
lowest possible cost of capital for the firm. Once the firm finds this optimal combination of 
financing sources (that is, the mix of debt and equity sources that equates the benefits of the 
tax shield provided by debt with the increased costs of financial distress borne by the firm‟s 
equity holders) the assumption is that every new dollar of financing is raised in the same 
proportions of debt and equity financing. 
Based on this theory, optimum leverage is determined by balancing of the corporate tax 
saving advantage of debt against the costs of bankruptcy. This has been extensively discussed 
in DeAngelo and Masulis (1988), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Barclay and Smith (1999) 
and Myers (2002). Static Trade-Off Theory predicts that more profitable firms should carry 
more debt since they have more profits that need to be protected from taxation. Other 
criticized this prediction such as Myers (1984), Titman and Wesels (1988), and Fama and 
French (2002). 
Debt enables the possibility to deduct interest charges raising incentive for higher leverage in 
order to maximize the tax shield. By doing this the firm value increases with the value of the 
tax shield (Graham, 2000). Damodaran (2001) stretches the increased financial discipline for 
managers as a consequence of higher debt levels. Therefore, according to the Trade-Off 
theory, an optimal debt level which maximizes the value of the firm does exist, when attaining 
a trade off as balancing the benefits of debt against the cost of financial distress (Figure 2). 
Naturally, it lies in every firm‟s interest to find an optimal balance between internal and 
external financing. 
This is consistent with the Trade-Off theory. A firm that has a target level of debt and if 
deviations from that target are gradually removed over time, a firm is said to exhibit target 
adjustment behavior (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
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Figure 2. Trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt. According to the trade-off theory, optimal 
capital structure supposes that firms balance the financial discipline and marginal present values of interest 
tax shields against the costs of financial distress. Equity financing is shown by blue line and debt financing 
is shown by green line. 
                           
Source: H. Shmidt, S. Shmidt, 2008, Capital Structure: A Swedish Real Estate Study.  
 
2.2.4 Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking Order theory of capital structure states that firms have a preferred hierarchy for 
financing decisions. The highest preference is to use internal financing (retained earnings and 
the effects of depreciation) before applying to any form of external funds (external financing). 
Internal funds incur no flotation costs and require no additional disclosure of proprietary 
financial information that could lead to more severe market discipline and a possible loss of 
competitive advantage. If a firm must use external funds, the preference is to use the 
following order of financing sources: debt, convertible securities, preferred stock, and 
common stock (Myers, 1984). The financing choices given by the pecking order theory are 
represented in figure 3. This order reflects the motivations of the financial manager to retain 
control of the firm, reduce the agency costs of equity, and avoid the inevitable negative 
market reaction to an announcement of a new equity issue (Hawawini & Viallet, 1999). 
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Figure 3. Pecking order of financial hierarchy. 
                            
Source: H. Shmidt, S. Shmidt, 2008, Capital Structure: A Swedish Real Estate Study. 
 
Implicit in pecking order theory are two key assumptions about financial managers. The first 
of these is asymmetric information, or the likelihood that a firm‟s managers know more about 
the company‟s current earnings and future growth opportunities than do outside investors. The 
use of internal funds saves managers from having to make public disclosures about the 
company‟s investment opportunities and potential profits to be realized from investing in 
them. The second assumption is that managers will act in the best interests of the company‟s 
existing shareholders. The managers may even forgo a positive-NPV project if it would 
require the issue of new equity, since this would give much of the project‟s value to new 
shareholders at the expense of the old (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Pecking Order hypothesis‟s predictions about leverage, debt typically grows when investment 
exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings as opposed 
to a more complex view of the model. More recent study on pecking order hypothesis 
documented Fama and French (2002) have tested some qualitative predictions of the pecking 
order theory. In their findings suggest that more profitable firms are less levered and this is 
consistent with the Pecking Order.  
The main objective of the pecking order theory is to point out that asymmetric information 
and signaling problems exists between managers and less-informed outside investors. In this 
order firms tend to exhaust their internal funds first, use safe debt second and riskier external 
equity as a last resort. A financial hierarchy is apparent which exemplifies that when firms are 
facing financial deficits they tend to go further down the pecking order. 
Studies have shown a negative relation between leverage and profitability, which can be 
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explained by the pecking order theory. According to Brealey et al (2006) the pecking order 
theory work best for large and mature firms that have access to public bond markets, prefer 
internal financing and rarely issue equity. In case of smaller growth firms the pecking order 
theory seems to be inconsistent with empirical studies. Brealey et al (2006) mentions that 
when external financing is required these smaller firms are more likely to rely on equity 
issuance which is against the theory of Pecking Order. 
The presented above theories are the main framework explaining the choice of capital 
structure. Having these theories and the current crisis set-up I will try to explain the structure 
of capital financing by formulating a set of hypotheses based on previous empirical evidence. 
 
2.3 Review of empirical literature and hypothesis motivation 
 
As it was mentioned before the purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure of corporate 
financing in the current slowdown of the market. From the theory we know that a corporation 
finances its assets through some combination of equity and debt. In the conditions of financial 
crisis we are interested more in the debt side of the corporate financing since this crisis was 
triggered by liquidity short fall and reduced credit availability in the United States banking 
sector (Douglas/Elliot, June 2009). 
Also prior to the financial crisis, roughly 40% of lending was eventually supplied by buyers 
of securitized packages of loans. These end-investors were mutual funds, pension funds, and 
other investors who had traditionally not been the main loan providers, as an alternative 
providing credit predominantly through the acquisition of corporate bonds. Securitization has 
collapsed to a fraction of its previous volume and these sources of credit capacity have largely 
withdrawn, leaving a gap (Douglas/Elliot, June 2009). As a result is possible to say that the 
crisis influenced the companies more through debt side of corporate financing. That is why I 
will start my analysis by studding the level of corporate debt in 2007-2009 periods. 
A few empirical studies have been performed concerning the level of leverage in the times of 
crisis. Bris et. al. (2002), conducted a study using company-level data from 17 countries that 
experienced a currency crisis during the past decade. They also include data from three 
control countries, whose currencies were under attack but remained quite stable. First, they 
studied leverage on the company-level before and after the currency crises. They documented 
increasing leverage before the onset of the crises for Europe, Asia, and Latin America. After 
the respective crises, they show that leverage further increases in Asia and Latin America but 
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not in Europe. Furthermore, the increasing leverage during the pre- and post-crisis periods 
was restricted to the countries forced to devalue their currencies during the crisis. 
 Bris et al. (2002) also assumes that it is also possible that the results were mere accounting 
artifacts: since they also document that firm profitability declines prior to a currency crisis, a 
reduction in earnings could automatically increase the debt-to-value ratios. Finally, leverage 
increases could be completely unrelated to currency crises, only a result of the preference for 
debt over equity during the 1990s. 
Nigel et. al. (2005) in his work concentrates on the analysis of the recent Asian Crisis and 
highlights the moral hazard problem of bad loans in poorly supervised and regulated East 
Asian economies. He concentrates on the process of dynamic adjustment of the actual 
leverage towards the optimum in time of crisis. Compared with the least affected countries 
there seems to have been a greater reliance on debt in the worst affected countries throughout 
crisis period. It is well documented that many East Asian corporations in the worst affected 
countries were heavily reliant on debt during crisis period.  Following the crisis, however, the 
share of debt generally decreased in all these countries though the decrease was more 
perceptible in Korea where the average share of debt was even lower than that in the pre-crisis 
period average. Also Gunay (2002) in his work shows he impact of economic crisis in Turkey 
(1999-2001) on the capital structure of corporations, which are traded in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. He proves that the leverage of firms increased on average after economic crisis as 
a result of interest rate increase and devaluation. 
Ariff et al. (2008) studies capital structure adjustment dynamics and, in addition, estimates the 
factors driving capital structure adjustment of financially distressed and healthy firms. He 
finds out that prior to the crisis, the debt ratio of distressed firms was higher compared with 
one for healthy firms: the difference was not significant. Second, after the crisis had done its 
damage, debt level increased more for the distressed cases than for the healthy firms.  These 
differences in debt ratio are significant. Further, statistics show that the proportion of short-
term debt dominating the distressed firms, increased with more than half in contrast, to the 
healthy firms‟ share of short-term debt. 
It is clear from the empirical evidence that an economic slowdown influences the level of debt 
that companies have. In what follows I will turn to the conditions of current financial crisis 
and their impact on the level of debt. 
 In the current crisis global financial markets are in turmoil. Share prices have fallen 
drastically, the cost of corporate and bank borrowing has risen substantially, and financial 
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market volatility is at levels that have rarely been seen. While the chaos in financial markets is 
in full view, its effect on the real economy is less clear. Recent press accounts ( New York 
Times, October 24, 2008) suggest that banks are indeed scaling back on new loans, thereby 
reducing corporate investment and output, while a recent working paper by V.V. Chari, 
Lawrence Christiano and Patrick Kehoe (CCK, 2008) suggests just the opposite. In their 
paper, Ivashina and Scharfstein (November 5, 2008) describe bank lending during the 
financial crisis through October 31, 2008. They show that there has been a steep decline in 
new loans to large corporations. The decline started a year ago as the credit bubble deflated, 
and has accelerated during the peak period of the financial crisis. From August – October 
2008 new loans were 36% less than they were in the prior three-month period. The drop was 
particularly large in October, 2008. Lending for productive investment such as physical and 
working capital has fallen as much as lending for leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Revolving credit facilities have fallen more than term loans, and non-
investment grade lending has fallen more than investment grade lending.  
During late 2007, the federal funds rate went up as banks became fearful of loaning to each 
other. The Fed eventually had to lower the federal funds rate in order to calm fears and restore 
confidence in the financial markets. In September of 2007, the Fed cut the federal funds rate 
0, 5 point to 4, 75%. By January 2008, that rate had to be cut to 3%. 
It didn‟t seem, by 2008, that lowering interest rates was working to restore confidence in the 
financial markets and restore credit flow. Lehman Brothers failed, Bear Stearns and AIG were 
bailed out, and the TARP program was passed in order to provide funds to big financial 
institutions that were in danger of failing. By October of 2008, the federal funds rate was 1% 
and in November 2009, it was around 12% (Federal Reserve Statistical Release, 6 November 
2009). 
As a conclusion of the facts stated above, I can say that there is a reduced availability of 
credits, decrease of federal funds and the deleverage effect presented in economy, together 
with the detainment of liquidity. This leads to the idea that the level of debt in the companies 
decreased in the crisis period. But still there is a question whether the companies decreased 
their leverage because debt became unavailable or because companies wanted have a safe 
capital structure. If that is the case, then companies more probably were backing off on debt 
also because of the increasing bankruptcy costs. The main criteria in measuring bankruptcy 
costs are such indicators as: unprofitable business, presence of overdue liabilities, total 
liabilities exceeding total assets, inability to pay off current liabilities by current assets and 
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decreasing of market value of shares and securities. Many of these criteria fit the conditions in 
which market is activating in this period so there is present an increase in the bankruptcy costs 
for companies. This might be one of the reasons which could partially explain the decrease in 
leverage of companies and deleveraging effect together with the tightening of credit 
conditions and detainment of liquidity. The above discussion leads to the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Leverage of the firms will decrease in time of current crisis. 
From the empirical evidence analyzed above we can deduce that a typical feature of an 
economic slowdown is that the level of debt increased before and after the event. What 
follows from the conditions of current crisis is that debt indeed increased before the crisis but 
during the crisis registered a sharp decrease. Assuming the fact that companies have a lower 
share of debt in their capital structure raises the question of the way the companies will 
finance their operations and investment. There are two competing theories about the way how 
the companies decide about capital structure financing taking in consideration the evolution of 
debt: Pecking Order and Static Trade-Off theory. 
According to the Pecking Order hypothesis, firms follow the hierarchical structure of 
preferred source of external finance described before because the amount of mispricing and 
loss of wealth to their shareholders depend on the type of security issued. The amount is least 
for debt and highest for external equity because the potential impact of new information on 
the value of a security, if the information is released to the market after the security is sold, 
depends on the type of security it is. Such information will have the least impact on the value 
of debt because of the high priority of claims to the income and assets of a firm that is usually 
accorded owners of debt. But the information will have the highest impact on the value of 
equity because its owners usually have only a residual claim to the income and assets of a 
firm. 
According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) the Pecking Order assumes that every capital 
outflow causes a financing deficit by the same amount of capital. In order to reduce this 
deficit the firm raises debt. Equity will only be issued as a last resort due to significant costs 
of financial distress. They also argue that under the Pecking Order hypothesis, after an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO), equity issues are only used in extreme circumstances. By constructing 
a financing deficit variable from information on corporate cash flow one can test if the 
Pecking Order theory is relevant. The deficit variable is constructed by the sum of dividends, 
net investments, change in working capital and internal cash flow. 
                                                                                                               19 
 
 
Abimbola Adedeji (2002) makes a test of the Pecking Order theory on UK companies and 
shows that new debt issues do not have the one-to-one relationship with internal funds flow 
deficits that pecking order hypothesis predicts. It appears from the evidence that only about 20-
30% of internal funds flow deficit are financed by new debt issues and that while Pecking Order 
hypothesis does not explain new debt issues better than Static Trade-Off theory, the theory 
explains levels of long term debt ratio much better than the hypothesis. Another interesting 
observation of the study is that Pecking Order hypothesis explains new debt issues much better at 
high debt ratio levels than at low debt ratio levels. Obviously, this is contrary to the suggestion of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that Pecking Order hypothesis should explain new debt issues 
better at low debt ratio levels than at high debt ratio levels. In other study by Nazrul and Hisham 
(2009) the Pecking Order model suggests that the internal fund deficiency is the most 
important determinant that possibly explains the issuance of new debt in Malaysian capital 
market despite the lower predicting power. Static trade-off model is not fit to explain the 
issuance of new debt issue in Malaysian capital market. Also Gunay (2002) shows that 
Turkey companies in time of crisis choose their capital structure according to the pecking 
order theory. 
As it was said before, in the current crisis companies are dealing with tightened credit 
conditions and deleverage. Companies with bad business models as well as strong ongoing 
businesses burdened by overleveraged balance sheets need to confront the reality of today‟s 
credit and economic environment. Borrowers meet the current challenges by exploring the 
deleveraging devices and other options that are evolving during the remainder of this 
restructuring cycle. Companies are seeking deleveraging opportunities so as to minimize the 
risk that they will not be able to pay upcoming maturity of, their loan facilities, or the risk of 
financial covenant defaults and at the same time they are trying to maximize their chances of 
surviving this recession (CapitaLens, September 2009).  
While the financial and economic crisis is a current subject on everyone‟s agenda for some 
time, the impact of the crisis on the real economy is now being felt. Banks are much more 
risk-aware, thus leading to credit squeeze and companies experiencing difficulties with credit 
access. In this context, there is need for state aid in order to tackle the crisis. Consequently, 
while companies are focused on identifying the most suitable funding option(s) for their 
business in the current context, states are undertaking state aid actions to support companies 
facing financial distress. Worsening access to credit is forcing companies to cut costs. Many 
firms had to scale down their activities due to the lack of finance, also postponed or cancelled 
planned investments. Cash flow problems have forced companies to shed staff or to sell some 
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property all this because banks have become less willing to provide them with credit over the 
last months. 
 Murillo et. al. (2008) conducts a survey of 1050 chief financial officers (CFOs) and finds that 
not only do companies cancel investment due to tight credit markets, the vast majority of 
financially constrained firms have sold assets in order to fund operations in 2008: exactly 
70% of the constrained respondents in U.S. survey say that they are selling more assets now 
in 2008 than previously, compared to 37% of the unconstrained respondents, in order to 
obtain funds. They also inquire about how firms fund attractive investments when they are 
unable to borrow in financial markets. About half of U.S. firms say that they rely on internally 
generated cash flows to fund investment under these circumstances, and about four in ten say 
that they use cash reserves. Notably, 56% of constrained U.S. firms say that they cancel 
investment projects when they are unable to fund them with external funds, significantly 
greater than the 31% of constrained firms that say the same. Taking in consideration the 
predictions of Pecking Order hypothesis and the current situation the following hypothesis is 
formulated. 
Hypothesis II: In the time of current crisis any deficit that companies have is financed less by 
debt issuance. 
An another point of view concerning the choice of capital structure of firms is offered by the  
Static Trade-Off theory, which claims that a firm‟s optimal debt ratio is determined by a 
trade-off between the losses and gains of borrowing, holding the firm‟s assets and investment 
plans constant. Firm substitute‟s debt for equity or equity for debt until the value of the firm is 
maximized. The gain of debt is primarily the tax-shelter effect, which arises when paid 
interest on debt is deductible on the profit and loss account. The costs of debt are mainly 
direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. 
According to the trade-off theory managers are constantly striving to achieve an optimal 
capital structure. This optimum is achieved by reaching a target debt level. If being distracted, 
managers would have to work gradually back to the target debt level. Having a stable point of 
optimal debt would therefore result in a mean reverting behavior (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999). 
DeJong et al. (2009), in their paper, study a sample of U.S. firms in the period 1985-2005. 
They find that the Pecking Order theory is a better descriptor of firms‟ issue decisions than the 
Static Trade-Off theory, particularly they find that only a small minority of the firms that have 
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above-target leverage in a given year issue equity instead of debt. Hence, most firms increase 
their leverage, even when they are already above their estimated target. In contrast, when they 
focus on repurchase decisions they find that the Static Trade-Off theory is a stronger predictor 
of firms‟ capital structure decisions. The Static Trade-Off theory predicts that firms in this 
situation repurchase equity to increase their leverage. 
Cole Rebel (2008) has analyzed the capital-structure decisions of small, privately held U.S. 
firms. In general, these results are broadly supportive of the Pecking Order Theory and 
inconsistent with the Trade-Off Theory. From this is possible to deduce that before the crisis, 
capital structure of the firms was more consistent with the predictions of the Pecking Order 
theory. 
Flannery/Rangan (2006) investigates if U.S. firms indeed have long-run target capital 
structures and if this is the case, how fast they adjust to this target. In the dynamic version of 
the classic trade-off theory, target debt level can be time-varying. The theory states that there 
will be adjustment toward the “optimal” target, if there are deviations from the optimal capital 
structure. The main purpose of capital structure study using dynamic partial adjustment 
models is then to approximate the speed of adjustment. They find out that about 34 % of the 
deviation from optimal leverage is eliminated in each period, taking about three years for the 
average firm to adjust to its target capital structure following shocks. 
As it was mentioned, prior to the crisis most of the firms became overleveraged, and now, in 
the current crisis situation, all firms are trying to adjust to a safe debt level in order to survive 
in this turmoil. It‟s clear that the costs of debt (direct and indirect) have increased and the 
bankruptcy is a real threat for a big amount of highly leveraged companies. The new 
borrowing environment means the cost of capital for corporations remains higher than in the 
boom years before the crisis hit, even as official US interest rates have been slashed to near 
zero (Reuters, September 14, 2009). So companies are trying to off-set this cost by reducing 
the level of debt. Leverage increases the risk of default. When the crisis hit, leveraged 
households, financial, non-financial institutions and even countries were forced to learn core 
principle – risk requires compensation – in a painful fashion. Their efforts to reduce risk (for 
which they had been inadequately compensated) through deleveraging often proved 
infeasible. Some financial institutions failed.  
So companies through their action are trying to attain an optimal capital structure. According 
to the trade-off theory, an optimal debt level which maximizes the value of the firm does exist, 
when attaining a trade off as balancing the benefits of debt against the cost of financial 
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distress. Of course, it is in each firm‟s interest to find an optimal balance between internal and 
external financing trade-off theory. When the resulting “optimal” or target leverage varies 
over time (thanks to time-varying determinants), this is labeled the dynamic trade-off theory. 
Firms should adjust their capital structure to some target level if shocks to actual leverage 
occur. From the above discussion is possible to deduce the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis III: Firms in the crisis are adjusting their capital structure to a target debt level in 
order to attain a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of debt.  
In concordance with the Trade-Off theory more profitable firms should use more debt since 
they have the possibility to shield more profit in order to get tax benefits associated with the 
use of debt tax shields. However, this is not a common finding since both Fama and French 
(2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) finds that there often is a negative relationship between 
leverage and profitability. The Pecking Order theory argues that more profitable firms have a 
reduced need for external financing. The profits will therefore be used to pay down debt and 
the firms will achieve a low debt ratio over time. 
A few empirical studies have been performed to analyze the relationship between leverage 
and corporate performance. The major difference between them is found in the definition of 
corporate performance. One series of papers uses basic accounting measures of performance. 
Majumdar and Chhibber (1999) test the relationship between leverage and corporate 
performance on a sample of Indian companies. Adopting an accounting measure of 
profitability, return on net worth, in order to evaluate performance, they observe a significant 
negative link between leverage and corporate performance. Kinsman and Newman (1999) use 
various measures of performance on a sample of US firms, based on accounting or ownership 
information (firm value, cash-flow, liquidity, earnings, institutional ownership and managerial 
ownership). They perform regressions of leverage on this set of performance measures. Their 
conclusion is that the existence of robust relationships between leverage and some of the 
measures of performance such as a negative link with firm value and cash-flow. Bris et al. 
(2004), sort companies into two groups, depending on whether they benefited from or were 
harmed by crisis. While leverage increases and profitability declines for all companies, these 
effects are more pronounced for negative-exchange-rate-exposure companies.  
There can also be mentioned several empirical works that focus on the determinants of 
leverage and test the profitability variable. It must be emphasized however, that profitability 
cannot be strictly considered as a performance variable to explain leverage, since profitability 
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is the source of internal financing. As a result, there exists a negative impact of profitability 
on leverage, as higher profitability means a reduced need for external financing such as 
financial debt. Here the conclusion is undoubtedly a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Johnson (1997), Michaelas et al. 
(1999)). 
There is however a second series of works focusing on the relationship between leverage and 
corporate performance that develop more sophisticated measures of performance. Pushner 
(1995) aims to investigate the relationship between leverage and corporate performance in 
conjunction with the influence of equity ownership in Japan. Here, corporate performance is 
measured by total factor productivity: a production frontier is estimated, in which 
performance is equal to the residual of OLS estimate. He concludes that a negative 
relationship exists between leverage and corporate performance. Two studies test the role of 
financial pressure on corporate performance, which is a closely related issue. Both analyze 
data on the United Kingdom and again measure corporate performance as total factor 
productivity. Nickell et al. (1997) observe a positive link between financial pressure and 
productivity growth, while Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) conclude to a weak positive effect of 
financial pressure on productivity growth. 
To conclude this brief survey about former empirical literature, it appears that there is no 
consensus on the relationship between leverage and corporate performance.  
According to the results of Gunay (2002), who made a study on Turkish companies during 
crisis (1999-2001), firms with a low level of debt nearly immunize themselves against 
economic crisis by having low leverages. Thus, the profitability and capital structure of low 
leverage firms will not be affected from the economic crisis as much as the high leverage 
firms, after the impact of economic crisis subsides. 
It is obvious that the level of debt in the capital structure of companies decreased in the 
downturn but still remains unclear the effect of the crisis on the economic situation and 
profitability of real sector companies. In the light of current events the biggest emphasis is on 
the analysis of financial sector while the economy real sector is lacking attention. 
The slowdown, although it started as a financial crisis, soon spread to the whole economy. 
The collapse of the housing bubble caused the value of investments to fall. The companies 
that had invested in subprime loans lost a total of about $512 billion. More than half of the 
money lost, $260 billion, was lost by American firms. For example the crisis affected severely 
the American automobile manufacturing industry lowering the profits of the companies. 
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In the current crisis according to a report by Citigroup‟s financial strategy group, companies 
that are more profitable and less leveraged are enjoying better valuations and prospects as 
stock markets rebound from the global financial crisis. Leveraging became very profitable for 
firms, until the bubble burst. Now burdened with debt, many of those firms are in danger of 
defaulting. According to a report released in March 21, 2009, there were 93 US companies at 
risk of defaulting on $53 billion in debts, marking a 50 percent jump since the credit crisis 
started. Generalizing these facts, we can say that the profitability of the real sector industries 
decreased and apparently the level of debt didn‟t play the last role in this fact. 
Correspondingly, the fourth hypothesis of this study will be formulated in the following way. 
 
Hypothesis IV: The debt and profitability are expected to be inversely related in the time of 
current crisis. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology and Models 
 
 
 
3.1 Companies and Data 
 
The country studied in this paper is USA and was selected because it was most directly 
affected by the current financial crisis. The financial crisis that began in the United States in 
the sub-prime mortgage market in 2007 and that spread quickly to Europe has become a 
global crisis, affecting both financial systems across the globe and economic activity in all 
countries (Jack Boorman, 2009). The IMF estimates that the total losses around the world 
may reach more than USD 4 000 billion.  The major part of the losses is expected to stem 
from US assets. The level of loss given default is expected to be twice as high in the USA as 
in Europe. The banking sector is expected to account for two-thirds of the global write downs 
and losses (Monetary Policy Report, February 2009). The fourth quarter of 2008 produced a 
6.3 percent decline in USA's GDP–the biggest drop in 25 years.  The U.S. economy has 
contracted 6.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 as the U.S. Commerce Department‟s latest 
report unveiled. The drop in GDP comes despite rising consumer spending. The falling GDP 
figures over the past consecutive three quarters of 2009, hasn‟t happened in 34 years, since 
third-quarter 1974 through first-quarter 1975 (Global Crisis News, April 29). 
There are analyzed 60 USA companies from 6 industries: consumer goods industry, consumer 
services, basic materials industry, oil and gas, industrial and technology. These industries 
belong to the real sector of the economy. Data about these companies is collected for a period 
of three years: 2007, 2008, 2009 and is used to test the hypotheses of this study. The crisis, 
which has its roots in the closing years of the 20th century, really started to show its effects in 
the middle of 2007 and has exposed pervasive weaknesses in financial industry regulation and 
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the global financial system during 2008 and 2009 (Ben S. Bernanke, April 14, 2009). T-test, f-
test, fixed effects test, regression analysis by using cross- section, time series and panel data is 
used to test the hypotheses of this study.  As usual, firm-specific variables are observed as 
panel data, i.e. with a large number of observations in the cross-section (individuals) over 
short periods of time. If the panel dataset is not used then as usual there are some major 
drawbacks in the models. First, the (additional) information content of observing the same 
entity repeatedly is not totally exploited. Also additional problems associated with panel data 
may occur with incomplete data, sample selection and survivorship biases, and outliers in the 
data.  
To be included in the sample firms must be listed NYSE Euronext, the holding company 
created by the combination of NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., was launched on April 4, 
2007. NYSE Euronext (NYSE/New York and Euronext/Paris: NYX) operates the world‟s 
largest and most liquid exchange group and offers the most diverse array of financial products 
and services. Each firm must have financial data reported in the Reuters database for the all 
analyzed years and also each firm must have complete financial information for the entire 
sample period.  
 
3.2 Models and Variables   
 
3.2.1 Leverage Testing  
 
Capital structure is a term that refers to the combination of different types of securities (debt, 
stocks) which are issued by a company to finance its assets. When a company has no debt it 
said to be unlevered, while a firm with debt in its capital structure is said to be leveraged. Two 
major leverage terms can be distinguished: operational leverage and financial leverage. 
Operational leverage is related to a company‟s fixed operating cost and it increases the 
business (or the operating) risk. Financial leverage is related to fixed debt cost and increases 
the financial risk. Total leverage is then given by a firm‟s use of both fixed operating costs 
and debt costs, implying that a firm‟s total risk equals business risk plus financial risk1. In this 
study of capital structure and its determinants, by leverage, I mean financial leverage. 
                                                 
1
 For a textbook treatment of leverage and risk, see e.g. Brealy and Myers (2003). 
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There are many and different measures of capital structure. From them two major categories 
of leverage measures exist: those that are based on market value of equity, and those that are 
based on book value of equity. Book values are used primarily because using market values 
might yield doubtful results. For example, a decline in stock prices implies an increase in 
debt-to-value ratios with no increase in the amount of debt, if market values are used. 
One of the most important problems is choosing an appropriate leverage measure as the 
dependent variable. In their paper Rajan and Zingales (1995), argue that the choice of this 
measure depends on the objective of the analysis. Though, they conclude that the best 
representation of past financing decisions is probably the ratio of total debt over capital (total 
debt plus equity). 
 Table 1 below lists the different measures of leverage and each measure‟s pros and cons, 
presented in Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
For testing the first hypothesis, debt-to-value ratios are reported as a measure of leverage, for 
all the firms in sample. The debt-to-value ratios are analyzed for the whole period of 3 years 
(2007-2009). For each firm, data is gathered on its total debt-to-value ratio as well as on the 
ratio of short-term and long-term debt to capital from Reuters Datastream. In this part is 
analyzed the level of leverage for the US companies and its evolution across time for the 
period of interest. Also are analyzed the changes in short-term and long-term debt ratios to 
capital, where short-term is defined as a maturity of less than 1 year. 
For this study, following leverage measures will be analyzed: the ratio of 
• total liabilities over total assets, 
• total debt over total assets, 
• total debt over capital. 
In this paper, total debt equals total liabilities less untaxed reserves. 
 
Table 1. Different measures of leverage and corresponding pros and cons, according to Rajan and Zingales 
(1995). 
Leverage measure  Pros and cons 
 Total liabilities / 
Total assets 
+ The broadest definition of leverage; proxy for what is left for shareholders in case of 
   liquidation. 
   Not a good indication of whether the firm is at risk of default in the near future. 
-  May overstate leverage since total liabilities includes items like accounts payable, 
   untaxed reserves etc. 
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Total debt / 
total assets 
+ Does not include liabilities like untaxed reserves or accounts payable (for transaction 
   purposes); more appropriate measure of leverage than (1) above. 
-  Affected by level of trade credit (i.e. unpaid bills; makes up bulk of accounts 
   payable). 
Total debt / 
net assets 
+ Not influenced by trade credit. (Net assets = total assets − accounts payable − other 
   liabilities). 
-  Still affected by factors that have nothing to do with financing, e.g. assets held against 
   pension liabilities. 
Total debt / 
Capital 
+ Probably the best representation of past financing decisions (capital = total debt + 
equity). 
- 
EBIT / 
Interest expense 
+ Measure of the risk that equity holders will not be able to make fixed payments and 
   will have to give up control. Appropriate measure if investments equal in magnitude    to     
depreciation needed to keep the firm a going concern. 
- Based in assumption that short-term liabilities like accounts payable and short-term 
  debt will be rolled over. Very sensitive to income fluctuations. 
 
EBITDA / 
Interest expense 
+ Measure of the risk that equity holders will not be able to make fixed payments and 
   will have to give up control. Appropriate if no such investments as in (5) are needed. 
-  Same as for (5). 
 
The ratio of total debt over net assets cannot be readily observed, due to limitations in the data 
set. 
 
3.2.2 Pecking Order Model 
 
As it was mentioned according to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) the pecking order 
assumes that every capital outflow causes a financing deficit by the same amount of capital. 
As is known there are three sources of funding available to firms: retained earnings, debt, and 
equity. If you look from the point of view of an investor, equity is more risky than debt. This 
is why an outside investor will require a higher rate of return on equity than on debt. From the 
point of view of the firm, a better source of funds are retained earnings than is debt, and debt 
is a better source of financing than equity. This way, if a firm will be in need of funds, first of 
all the firm will fund the projects using retained earnings. If there are not enough retained 
earnings, then debt financing will be used. Thus, for a firm in normal operations, equity will 
not be used and the financing deficit will match the net debt issues. Equity will only be issued 
as a last resort due to significant costs of financial distress. By constructing a financing deficit 
variable from information on corporate cash flow one can test if the pecking order theory is 
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relevant. The deficit variable is constructed by the sum of dividends, net investments, change 
in working capital and internal cash flow. 
 
                                    DEFit = DIVit + Iit + ΔWit – Cit = ΔDit + ΔEit,   if                             Equation 1 
DEFit = DIVit + Iit + ΔWit > Cit, otherwise DEFit =0. 
 
The variables included in the equation are presented in the following table 
 
Table 2. Summary of variables for testing the pecking order theory. 
Variable Definition 
Firm i, Year t   Refers to firm, i, and year, t 
Net Financing Deficit, DEFit Surplus / deficit during year t 
Cash Dividend Paid, DIVit Cash dividend paid at end of year t 
 
Net Investments, Iit  
 
Net capital expenditures of firm i at time t (i.e., Iit=changes in 
total assets from time t-1 to time t – changes in total liabilities 
from time t-1 to time t); 
 
Change in Working Capital, 
ΔWit 
 
Change in working capital in year t (i.e., ∆Wit=change in 
operating working capital + change in cash and cash 
equivalents + change   in current debt); 
Net Internal Cash Flow, Cit  Cash flow after interest and taxes (i.e., Cit = income before 
extraordinary items +depreciation and amortization + 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations +deferred 
taxes + equity in net loss – earnings + other funds from 
operations + gain(loss) from sales of PPE and other 
investments); 
 
Net debt, ΔDit   
 
Net debt issued in year t (i.e., ΔDit=long-term debt issuance - 
 long-term debt reduction); 
 
Net Equity Issuance, ΔEit 
 
Net equity issued in year t (i.e., ∆Eit = sale of common stock 
minus stock repurchases) 
 
When having defined the deficit variable, testing the pecking order should be fairly straight 
forward:  
                                                    ΔDit = α + βPODEFit + εit                                                      Equation 2 
εit - error term. 
This is the general form of the model testing for POH and if net deficit is to be entirely 
financed with net debt issuance the following hypothesis according to the model must be true: 
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                                                           βPO = 1.                                                 Hypothesis 1 
 
Since the assumption is that the net deficit of firms will not be entirely financed by debt a 
rejection of the βPO = 1 will satisfy the second hypothesis of this study. 
As opposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) there might be factors in equation that do not 
affect the net debt issuance on an aggregate level. The different components in DEF may have 
different impact on ΔD. For this to be tested it is needed to stress the variables on a separate 
basis and therefore also run the equation in its disaggregated form. 
 
                                ΔDit = α + βDIVDIVit + βIIit + βWΔWit – βCCit + εit                             Equation 3 
 
For the aggregation step to be justified the following pecking order theory hypothesis must 
therefore be true: 
                                              βDIV = βI = βW = βC = 1.                                    Hypothesis 2 
 
Again a rejection of the PO hypothesis stated above will sustain the fact that a firm will not be 
financed entirely by debt in current crisis.  
 
3.2.3 Dynamic Partial-Adjustment Trade-off Model  
 
According to the trade-off theory the companies are constantly striving to achieve an optimal 
capital structure. This optimum is achieved by reaching a target debt level. As a result of the 
cyclical nature of economy this level is influenced by disturbances which cause firms 
distraction from reaching this optimum. If being distracted, the firm would have to return 
back to the target debt level. Having a stable point of optimal debt would therefore result in a 
mean reverting behavior. 
In the dynamic version of the classic trade-off theory, objective leverage can be time-varying. 
If the companies are deviating from the optimal capital structure, the theory states that there 
will be correction toward the “optimal” target. The most important objective of capital 
structure study using dynamic partial adjustment models is then to approximate the speed of 
adjustment. Flannery and Rangan (2006) investigate whether United States firms really have 
long-run target capital structures and if they do, then how quick they adjust to this target.  
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Flannery and Rangan (2006) pay attention to the model specification and econometric 
methods they use, emphasizing the need to take the panel nature of the data in consideration. 
Target leverage of a particular firm i at a future time (t+1) is determined by a set of firm 
characteristics denoted Xit. These characteristics represent the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of debt in various capital structures. From this we can deduce the aimed leverage 
given by: 
 
                                                           MDRi, t+1 = βXit,                                               Equation 4 
 
Here MDR i, t+1 denotes market debt ratio and β is a coefficient vector. In the case firms would 
have a target capital structure there would have been at least some elements of β different 
from zero. The Flannery/Rangan (2006) partial adjustment model is the following: 
 
                                         MDRi, t+1 = (λβ) Xit + (1-λ) MDR i, t+ μi+ δi,t+1,                  Equation 5 
 
In this model λ is the adjustment speed coefficient, μi a time-invariant unobserved variable 
(firm fixed effect), and δi,t+1 an error term. All firms are assumed to have the same speed of 
adjustment and catch the degree to which deviations from optimal level of leverage are 
eliminated in each period. If the current deviation from the target debt ratio marginally 
increases, the difference between the future and the current debt ratio increases by λ. When 
λ=0, this means that the speed of adjustment is zero, so, there is no adjustment at all. When λ 
= 1, the speed of adjustment is very high, this implies that the debt ratio is always at its target 
value. 
Instrumental variable estimations controlling for time-invariant and firm-invariant unobserved 
variables (time and firm fixed effects) of the partial adjustment model are presented in table 3: 
  
Table 3. Summary variables for testing the trade-off model. 
Variable Definition 
Market leverage, MDRit Total Liabilities/(Total Liabilities+ Market Value of Equity; 
Profitability, Pit EBITDA / (Total Liabilities + Equity); 
Size, Sit Natural Logarithm of Sales; 
Market-to-Book, MTBit 
 
(Total Liabilities + Market value Equity) / (Total liabilities + 
Equity); 
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Tangibility, Tit Fixed Assets / (Total Liabilities + Equity); 
Depreciation, Dpit Depreciation encountered by firm i, in year t; 
Expected Inflation, EIit CPI forecasts by Economist Intelligence Unit; 
R&D Expenditure, R&Dit 
 
Research and Development Expenditures reported by firm i, in 
year t; 
No R&D Expenditure 
Reported [Dummy],R&Ddit 
 
1-No R&D Expenditures Reported; 0-R&D Expenditures  
Reported; 
 
Firm is rated [Dummy], Rdit 1-The Firm is Rated, 0-The Firm is not Rated; 
 
 
3.2.4 Dynamic Partial-Adjustment Trade-off Model with Macroeconomic 
Determinants. 
 
The dynamic partial-adjustment capital structure model is tested in this paper in order to find 
out which will be the financing decisions of U.S. companies in the times of current crisis. 
How the firms will choose their capital structure in the conditions of shock to all the 
aggregate macroeconomic variables. 
 Thus again, following Flannery and Rangan (2006), I estimate the impact of macroeconomic 
situation on the capital structure adjustment speed. Particularly, I model the target debt level 
of firm i in period t+1 (MDRi, t+1) as a linear function of a set of lagged macroeconomic 
variables (Macrot) and firm characteristic variables (Xi,t), which are the same as in Equation 
(5). So rearranging the model yields the following: 
 
                 MDRi, t+1 = (1-λ) MDR i, t+ (λβ) Xit + (γη) Macrot + μi+ δi,t+1,            Equation 6     
               
The dummy variables for year will not be incorporated in the following panel regression since 
these may absorb the time-varying effect of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure. 
The macroeconomic conditions are defined by a set of macroeconomic factors. In order to test 
the influence of macroeconomic conditions on the speed of capital structure adjustment is 
important to analyze these factors. In concordance with Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and, 
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Cook and Tang (2008) these factors include term spread, default spread, GDP growth rate, 
and the price-output ratio. 
The term spread is measured as the difference between long-term and short-term rate of 
interest. In our case this factor is measured as the difference between the U.S. twenty-year 
government securities yield and three-month Treasury-bill yield
2
.  High term spread is viewed 
as a strong interpreter for a good economy (Stock and Watson, 1989; Estrella and Mishkin, 
1998). Therefore, is expected a faster adjustment speed in good macroeconomic conditions as 
predicted by a high term spread. 
Default spread is defined as the difference between the average yield of bonds rated Baa and 
the average yield of bonds rated Aaa, each rated by Moody‟s. Following Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003) and Fama and French (1989), the default spread, that is, an average yield on Baa less 
Aaa Moody‟s rated corporate bonds with maturity of approximately 20 to 25 years, as a proxy 
for time variation in expected bankruptcy costs.  
Tracking long-term business cycle conditions is observed that this indicator is higher for the 
period of recessions and lower during expansions (Fama and French, 1989). Consequently, is 
expected that companies will adjust capital structure faster when default spreads are lower.  
In economics, a recession is a business cycle contraction, a general slowdown in economic 
activity over a period of time (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). Production as measured 
by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) falls for two or more successive quarters of a year in 
recession. I use the real GDP growth rate as a direct indicator of macroeconomic situation
3
. In 
good macroeconomic conditions the real GDP growth rate is higher and consequently, a faster 
adjustment speed is expected.  
In the analysis I will also employ an indicator of future stock market performance which is 
price-output ratio. The price-output ratio is calculated as the S&P500 stock price index in 
January in a given year scaled by GDP from the previous year.
4
 It has been observed that this 
price-output ratio tracks an important part of variation in both expected returns and excess 
returns on the aggregate stock market. The mean reversion in the price-output ratio implies 
that expected returns are high if current stock prices are low relative to current GDP. 
Therefore, everything else held fixed, I anticipate the adjustment speed of capital structure to 
be higher when the price-output ratio is lower. 
                                                 
2
 The data can be found at the Federal Reserve Statistical Release web-page 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm. 
3
  Data is retrieved from U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov/. 
4
  http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. 
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3.2.5 Conventional Model 
 
In the most empirical studies on capital structure determinants there is a list of variables that 
most probable affect capital structure choices. These variables suggested by Harris/Raviv 
(1991) in their theory review are: fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, 
firm size, earnings volatility, default risk, profitability, advertising expenditures, R&D 
expenditures, and product uniqueness. Harris/Raviv (1991, p. 334) even suggest that available 
studies “generally agree” on these determinants, although already the classic paper by 
Titman/Wessels (1988) finds no significant impact of non-debt tax-shields, volatility, 
collateral value, or future growth on debt ratios. 
This pattern of ambiguous and in part contradictory evidence can be traced through the 
empirical literature ever since Modigliani/Miller (1958). Still, the recent evidence has at least 
reached consensus on some variables and financing patterns that appear sufficiently robust 
empirically. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) presents a conventional leverage regression model consisting of four 
explanatory factors; growth, profitability, size, and tangibility. The reason for including these 
factors is that they have historical significant impact on leverage and have therefore survived 
many tests. Interpreting the trade-off and pecking order theory these variables will have 
specific impact on debt issuance.  
In their influential empirical study, Rajan/Zingales (1995) study the determinants of capital 
structure choices in main developed countries. In general, the authors find corporate leverage 
and its determinants in the G-7 countries to be fairly alike. Their proof serves as a starting 
point for variable choice in empirical studies since, comprising the factors growth, 
profitability, tangibility and size.  
As suggested by Frank/Goyal (2007) using only the mentioned above factors and omitting 
expected inflation and the median industry debt ratio leads to misspecifications, reporting 
other factors statistically insignificant or changing their signs. They make a study taking the 
data on U.S firms for the period 1950-2003 from COMPUSTAT, the authors find several 
cross-sectional factors of leverage that are “reliably important”. They make a list which 
includes 25 variables from earlier literature and find that six core variables are able to robustly 
explain 27 % of cross-sectional variation in leverage. Only 2 % of the variation is explained 
by remaining 19 determinants.  
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The conventional leverage regression is intended to explain the level of leverage, while the               
pecking order regression is intended to explain the change rather than the level (Frank, Goyal 
(2002)), the regression equation then takes the following form: 
 
MDRit = α + β∆Tit + β∆MTBit + β∆Sit + βPit + β∆IMDit + βDEFit + β∆EIit+εit  
Equation 6 
The conventional regression is run in first differences with the financing deficit as an added 
factor. ∆ denotes the first differences between years. 
The description of variables used in conventional model regression is presented in the table 4 
below.  
 
Table 4. Summary variables for testing the conventional model. 
Variable Definition 
Market leverage, MDRit Total Liabilities/(Total Liabilities+ Market Value of Equity; 
Profitability, Pit EBITDA / (Total Liabilities + Equity); 
Size, Sit Natural Logarithm of Sales; 
Market-to-Book, MTBit 
(Total Liabilities + Market value Equity) / (Total liabilities + 
Equity); 
Tangibility, Tit Fixed Assets / (Total Liabilities + Equity); 
Industry Median Debt, 
IMDit 
Median of Market Leverage by NACE code and by year. 
Industry is defined as the first digit NACE code level. 
Expected Inflation, EIit CPI forecasts by Economist Intelligence Unit: 
Net Financing Deficit, DEFit Surplus / deficit during year t 
 
In what follows I will summarize these core determinants of capital structure and their 
predicted effect on leverage by classic capital structure theories. 
 
Tangibility 
 
From the point of view of testing the pecking order, the most important of the conventional 
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variables is tangibility which is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. In line 
with Harris and Raviv (1991), under the predictions of pecking order theory, someone can 
expect that firms with little tangible assets would have bigger asymmetric information 
problems. In this way, firms with few tangible assets will tend to collect more debt over time 
and become more highly levered. Hence, Harris and Raviv argue that the pecking order 
predicts that βT<0. 
Findings by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Gaud et al (2005) are consistent with the trade-off 
theory saying that tangible assets are appropriate for the reason of raising debt since it act as 
good guarantee. It also seems to diminish the cost of financial distress. Closing this, firms 
with large ratios of tangible assets would be expected to raise more debt. On the other hand, a 
positive relationship between available tangible assets and leverage is consistent with the 
pecking order theory as well, if collateral reduces the relevance of asymmetric information, 
thereby making the preference order less strict. 
 
Growth (Market-to-Book) 
 
As usual firms with high market-to-book ratios are often thought to have more future growth 
opportunities. There also may be a concern that debt could limit a firm‟s ability to seize such 
opportunities when they appear Myers (1977). Goyal, Lehn, and Racic (2002) find that when 
growth opportunities of defense firms decline, these firms increase their use of debt financing. 
Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2001) present a model showing that the debt capacity of 
growth options can be negative. The common prediction is that βMTB<0 and this is consistent 
with the trade-off theory. This also might be because the availability of growth opportunities 
might increase expected costs of financial distress, resulting in lower leverage. 
The pecking order theory stretches that small firms faces larger information asymmetries and 
therefore raise more debt. In order to minimize such asymmetries, firms with high growth will 
seek to issue debt. Since high growth firms traditionally have higher market-to-book ratios 
this measure will be used as a proxy (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Also current and future growth 
must arise from (real) investments, which should be financed with more debt according to the 
pecking order theory. Thus, the negative relation between leverage and growth is not 
consistent with the pecking order theory. 
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Size (Sales) 
 
The trade-off theory suggest that there is a negative relationship between size and probability 
of default and concludes that larger firms should therefore be more leveraged. This is being 
consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2003). Larger 
or more mature firms are likely to have lower default risk, and are less opaque than smaller 
firms due to their established track record of success and the attention received from analysts 
and rating agencies (thus reducing informational asymmetries). These arguments imply a 
potential for higher leverage. 
According to the pecking order theory, the prediction on the size-leverage relationship is not 
clear due to the ambiguous impact of a reduced degree of asymmetric information on the 
relative agency costs of cash versus debt versus equity (Ralf Elsas and David Florysiak, 
2008). 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that pecking order theory predicts larger firms to raise more 
debt since they are considered more diversified and therefore less risky. Consequently more 
debt is found in capital structures for large firms due to lower information costs and good 
reputation in debt markets. 
 
Profitability 
 
According to the trade-off theory more profitable firms should use more debt because of the 
tax shield. This happens since they have the possibility to shield more profit in order to get tax 
benefits associated with the use of debt tax shields. Also if higher profitability decreased the 
expected costs of financial distress (assuming some stationarity of profitability), one would 
expect to find profitability to increase leverage under the trade-off theory. 
 But this is not a common finding since both Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) finds that there often is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. 
Kayhan/Titman (2007) also finds this relation in their analysis of changes in debt ratios, but 
the effect is relatively weak. In dynamic trade-off studies, profitability is also obviously 
negatively linked to leverage. It is generally observed that the financing behavior of firms is 
likely to change over time. For example, Frank/Goyal (2007) finds that profitability has lost 
some of its explanatory power for U.S. firms‟ capital structures over the last decades. 
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A conclusion from what was said above and which is consistent with the pecking order theory 
is the fact that more profitable firms have a reduced need for external financing. The profits 
will therefore be used to pay down debt and the firms will achieve a low debt ratio over time. 
Also, since higher profitability will translate into more free cash flow, debt should be more 
valuable due to its disciplining effect on managers. Thus, the finding of a negative 
relationship is more consistent with the pecking order theory, because higher cash flows with 
everything else held constant reduce the necessity to issue debt. 
 
Industry Median Debt Ratios 
 
From the previous studies the industry median debt variable has been found to have high 
explanatory power and is most often positively correlated with leverage. This seems obvious 
in analysis where we have just one variable, but in a multivariate context the median leverage 
should not any longer affect leverage, this is because one controls for the determinants of 
capital structure at the same time. To clarify the explanatory power, Frank/Goyal (2007) state 
that managers use industry median leverage as a point of reference within the industry or 
some kind of target capital structure to which they adjust (e.g. Hovakimian et al. (2001) find 
that firms adjust to the industry median leverage). On the other hand, the connection might be 
explained by industry median leverage accounting for absent factors common to the industry, 
such as product market interactions or the nature of competition. 
In their study, MacKay/Phillips (2005) also imply that firms‟ operational leverage relative to 
the industry median and the industries‟ degree of competition are important determinants of 
capital structures. 
 
Expected Inflation 
 
In the cross-sectional studies there is evidence that the connection between expected inflation 
and the level of debt is positive. Expected inflation is probably the least reliable factor among 
the six main factors suggested by Frank/Goyal (2007) due to estimation relying upon the   
trouble to observe expectations in general and the low occurrence of observations for 
macroeconomic data. 
 
If interpreting the trade-off- and pecking order theory the mentioned above variables will have 
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specific impact on net debt issuance which is summarized in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Expected Signs on Coefficients  
Factor Trade-off theory Pecking-order theory 
Tangibility + -     (+) 
Growth - + 
Size  + + 
Industry Median Debt + - 
Expected Inflation + - 
Profitability + - 
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Chapter 4 
 
Empirical Results 
 
 
 
4.1 Leverage testing 
 
Table 6, bellow, presents the mean and median figures of the leverage measures that were 
discussed before. As is possible to observe from the data, USA companies are not so high 
leveraged and more off, the ratios are decreasing for the examined period of time. 
 
Table 6. Mean and median values of different leverage measures for real sector American companies 2007-
2009. 
Year 
  
2007 2008 2009 Average 
Total liabilities/ 
Total assets 
Mean (%) 57,2 57,3 57,7 57,4 
Median (%) 55,5 59,0 57,3 57,3 
Total debt/ 
Total assets 
Mean (%) 42,4 27,5 21,9 30,6 
Median (%) 21,5 23,4 18,9 21,3 
Total debt/ 
 Capital 
Mean (%) 35,5 38,3 37,8 37,2 
Median (%) 33,6 36,9 32,4 34,3 
Note: Total debt= short-term debt + long-term debt.  Capital= total debt + book value of equity. 
 
The ratio of total liabilities over total assets has an average mean of 57,4 % and a median 
value of 57,3%, slowly increasing from 57,2% in 2007 to 57,7% in 2009. As we can see 
liabilities represent approximately half of the firm assets and the other half is equity. This is a 
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good indicator in the current situation as it assures a more stable capital structure and not such 
a big reliance on liability. However, this indicator might overstate leverage since it includes 
items like accounts payable, untaxed reserves etc. By excluding all this from total liabilities 
we get to the second leverage measure (total debt/total assets). As expected, this figure shows 
lower values of leverage than the previous one. From the table we can see that means value is 
30, 6% and the median is 21, 3%. This ratio is decreasing from 42, 4% in 2007 to 21, 9% in 
2009 which is a result of the current liquidity crisis followed by a tightening of the credits 
conditions to the business. The third measure (total debt/capital), gives an insight of how the 
companies are financing their operations and their financial strength. As we have seen from 
before USA companies are not so much reliant on debt. The mean and median values are 37, 
2% and 34, 3% respectively. This ratio increased by 2, 8% from 2007 to 2008 and then 
decreased by 0, 5% from 2008 to 2009. The median decreased over the analyzed period from 
33, 6 to 32, 4%, despite an increase in 2008. 
 The figures are in line with the predictions of this study concerning the evolution of debt in 
the capital structure of the American companies during the crisis period. 
 
4.1.1 Decomposition of total debt into short-term and long-term debt ratios. 
 
Since we are interested in the leverage level of the USA companies, it makes sense to analyze 
the sources of debt in more detail. For this purpose the total debt is separated in short-time 
debt and long-time debt components. 
Short-time debt consists of any debt incurred by a company that is due within one year. The 
debt in this account is usually made up of short-term bank loans taken out by a company. At 
the same time, short term debt financing provides the business with liquidity to conduct its 
day-to-day operations and to maintain working capital needs. However, it presents some 
disadvantages to the business as well. Between them is possible to mention the fact that short-
term debt only meets working capital or immediate business needs. It is not useful for 
servicing any long term plans with larger capital requirements, higher risk, and longer 
payback horizons. Also short term debt financing has to be monitored closely to avoid bad 
relationships with suppliers and bankers. 
In contrast to short-term borrowings, long-term debt is used to finance business investments 
that have longer payback periods (more than one year). 
The cost of long-term debt is generally much more than that of short-term borrowing. The 
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long-term debt agreement specifies the interest rate, the timing of interest payments, and the 
amount of monthly payments. A company with too much long term debt will find itself 
overwhelmed with interest payments and at risk of having too little working capital, 
potentially leading to bankruptcy. A company that is reducing its long term debt displays signs 
of prosperity as its reducing its payments associated with the debt. A company that is 
increasing its long term debt is deteriorating as its increasing its interest payments and 
eventually risks becoming insolvent and going bankrupt. 
In attempt to analyze determinants of corporate debt with respect to both short-term and long-
term debt ratios, I create two leverage measures (short-term debt/capital and long-term 
debt/capital). The resulting leverage figures are presented in table 7 below. 
 
Table 7. Mean and median values for long-term debt, short-term debt and total debt ratios for 2007-2009. 
Year 
  
2007 2008 2009 Average 
Short-term 
debt/ 
Capital 
Mean (%) 5,4 7,5 5,9 6,3 
Median (%) 1,4 2 1,7 1,7 
Long-term debt/ 
Capital 
Mean (%) 30,2 30,8 32,7 31,2 
Median (%) 27,2 30,1 27,8 28,4 
Total debt/ 
 Capital 
Mean (%) 35,5 38,3 37,8 37,2 
Median (%) 33,6 36,9 32,4 34,3 
 
As is possible to observe from the figures the ratio of short-term debt/capital represents 
approximately 1/5 of the total debt over capital. This is a very low figure but, represents a 
good indicator in the times of current crisis. During this crisis, access to funding is a problem 
because banks are in desperate need of capital and can‟t take risks that in ordinary times 
would be prudent. As a result, high levered companies do not have access to funds and can‟t 
fulfill their short-term obligations. Apparently, this is not such a big problem for the real-
sector American companies which are relying more on equity financing. 
 We can see that short-term debt/capital has increased with 2, 9% from 2007 to 2008. This 
happened at the early stages of the crisis when firm preferred short-term debt to finance their 
operations and banks were not so adverse on lending (The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 
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2009). From 2008 to 2009 the ratio of short-term debt decreased from 7, 55 to 5, 9% as a 
result of tightened credit conditions and deleveraging. We can see that the average median 
figure for the short-term debt ratio (1, 7%) is much more lower than the average one (6,3%) 
for the analyzed period. This tells us that the mean is overstated being influenced by a couple 
of outliers. 
Long-term debt, which represents the biggest part of company‟s debt, was more slowly 
increasing during this period in comparison with previous periods of time (30, 2% in 2007 to 
32, 7% in 2009). This is due to the need for equity injections, restrictions on liabilities and 
inaccessible long-term debt markets (Reuters, November 10, 2008).  
Now that the portion of long-term debt and short-term debt in total debt has been analyzed, it 
might be interesting to see how the ratio of short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt over 
capital vary across industries. The dataset contains information about American firms from six 
industries: basic materials, consumer goods, industrials, and technology, oil and gas and 
customer services. The resulting figures for short-term and total debt ratios are presented in 
table 8 bellow. As is possible to observe from the table the most leveraged are companies are 
from consumer goods and less levered from oil and gas industry with 16, 6% and respectively 
1, 9% average of short-term debt to capital.  
 
Table 8. Short-term debt and total debt ratios for industries. For convenience the figures for total debt to 
capital are shown here too. 
Industry 
  Short-term debt/Capital 
Average 
Total Debt/Capital 
Average 
  2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Basic 
Materials 
Mean (%) 4,8 7,8 4,3 5,6 39,2 42,7 40,3 40,7 
Median 
(%) 
3,7 4,6 1,7 3,3 39,2 44,5 40,5 41,4 
Consumer 
Goods 
Mean (%) 13,5 19,1 17,3 16,6 46,6 49,9 47 47,8 
Median 
(%) 
5,7 13,6 9,7 9,7 42,2 44,4 37,4 41,3 
Industrials 
Mean (%) 2,4 6,0 4,1 4,2 32,6 29,0 22,5 28,0 
Median 
(%) 
0,5 2,4 1,5 1,5 28,8 29,3 22,8 26,9 
Technology 
Mean (%) 4,5 7,0 3,9 5,1 27,7 35,3 46,2 36,4 
Median 
(%) 
0,8 0,7 1,0 0,8 30,2 30,1 24,2 28,2 
Oil and Gas 
Mean (%) 2,5 1,8 1,4 1,9 23,7 24,7 23,5 24,0 
Median 
(%) 
1,0 0,4 0,2 0,5 24,2 20,9 19,8 21,6 
Customer 
Services 
Mean (%) 4,6 3,2 4,5 4,1 43,5 48,1 47,1 46,2 
Median 
(%) 
3,2 2,0 3,4 2,9 37,3 43,7 37,4 39,5 
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We can see that although the level of short-term debt/capital slowly increased for most of the 
industries from 2007 to 2008, in 2009 this indicator decreased for all industries except 
customer services industry. It seems that the ratio of short-term debt in customer services 
sector was more affected by the crisis at the very beginning (1, 2% decrease) and by 2009 the 
situation improved (1, 4% increase). The median values are generally lower than the mean 
values, fact that tells us about the presence of outliers. 
As was mentioned before, long-term debt constitutes the most important part of debt 
financing of USA companies. Contrary to the findings above, table 9 below reveals that most 
highly leveraged with long-term debt are companies from customer services industry (42,4%). 
 
Table 9. Long-term debt and total debt ratios for industries. For convenience the figures for total debt to 
capital are shown here too. 
Industry 
  Long-term debt/Capital 
Average 
Total Debt/Capital 
Average 
  2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Basic Materials 
Mean (%) 34,3 34,9 41,3 36,8 39,2 42,7 40,3 40,7 
Median 
(%) 
31,9 38,6 41,5 37,3 39,2 44,5 40,5 41,4 
Consumer 
Goods 
Mean (%) 33,1 30,7 29,6 31,1 46,6 49,9 47,0 47,8 
Median 
(%) 
26,7 32,9 28,0 29,2 42,2 44,4 37,4 41,3 
Industrials 
Mean (%) 30,3 23,0 18,5 23,9 32,6 29,0 22,5 28,0 
Median 
(%) 
28,2 24 16,1 22,8 28,8 29,3 22,8 27,0 
Technology 
Mean (%) 23,2 28,3 42,3 31,3 27,7 35,3 46,2 36,4 
Median 
(%) 
11,9 16,4 13,8 14,0 30,2 30,1 24,2 28,2 
Oil and Gas 
Mean (%) 21,2 23,0 22,1 22,1 23,7 24,7 23,5 24,0 
Median 
(%) 
21,1 17,0 18,2 18,8 24,2 20,9 19,8 21,6 
Customer 
Services 
Mean (%) 38,9 44,9 42,7 42,2 43,5 48,1 47,1 46,2 
Median 
(%) 
29,6 40,6 36,1 35,4 37,3 43,7 37,4 39,5 
 
The less leveraged as in the case of short-term debt is oil and gas industry with 22, 1% of 
long-term debt to capital ratio. As in the previous case the long-term debt ratio to capital 
increases for most of the industries from 2007 to 2008. In 2009 there is observed a decrease in 
this indicator for all industries except basic materials and technology. Moreover, for 
technology industry this increase is around 11%. The results show that the ability of 
companies from this sector to finance their operations by long-term debt financing was not 
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affected at all by the crisis. The ratio of long-term debt to capital was steadily increasing for 
the analyzed period of time from 23, 2% in 2007 to 42, 3% in 2009. We can see that the 
median figures for this sector follow a different pattern. From this we can conclude that the 
level of long-term debt/capital in most of the firms in this sector declined but as a result of 
few outliers the mean figures are overstated. 
In what follows I would like to pay attention to total debt/capital ratio which is presented both 
in table 7 and 8. Total debt is composed from short-term debt and long-term debt which were 
discussed earlier. In order to analyze this indicator an additional measure will be used which 
is Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA). This is a stock market index that shows how 
30 large, publicly-owned companies based in the United States have traded during a standard 
trading session in the stock market (Sullivan, Arthur; Steven M. Sheffrin, 2003). 
 
Figure4. Total debt/capital by industry for the period 2007-2009. 
 
 
The value of the Dow is not the actual average of the prices of its component stocks, but 
rather the sum of the component prices divided by a divisor, which changes whenever one of 
the component stocks has a stock split or stock dividend, so as to generate a consistent value 
for the index. In Annex 1 we can see the DJIA of each industry for the period 2007-2009. 
Having these figures is possible to observe the patterns of evolution between market stock 
prices and the level of total debt to capital for each industry. 
The highest quotations of DJIA are for oil and gas and technology industry. As is possible to 
observe from the previous tables oil and gas industry has the lowest level of debt/capital. 
Technology sector has on average a relative low level of debt to capital in but this indicator is 
stabile increasing from 2007. Although, during the analyzed period, the level of debt to capital 
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stays stable for oil and gas industry and increases for technology industry in the second half of 
2008 DJIA dramatically fell more than twice in value. The situation remained the same until 
the end of first quarter of 2009, after which DJIA started to increase, especially for the 
technology sector. The situation is similar for all the industries, even for the industrials 
industry, whose level of debt decreased during the analyzed period of time. 
From this we can conclude that DJIA index is generally higher for the least leveraged 
companies and its values are currently increasing independent of the evolution of debt over 
capital for each industry. 
After analyzing the level of leverage of American companies in the current crisis I can say 
that the results correspond to the predictions of first hypothesis of this study. I would like to 
start with the fact that the USA companies were not highly leveraged. The debt represents less 
than 50 % of the total assets in 2007 and this ratio decreases by half until 2009. This fact 
could be explained by the tightened credit conditions of the crisis. Although some measure of 
leverage slightly increased in 2008, in 2009 they all went down. Some of these measures were 
scaled by assets and is important to mention that in 2009 the level of assets also decreased 
(Annex 2). This happen as a result of the deleveraging process that became very popular and 
many companies were and are using it in order to obtain resources to finance their activities. 
Those measures of leverage that that were scaled by capital also went down although equity 
was stable increasing during the crisis period. 
If we are trying to analyze the level of debt as a measure composed from short-term debt and 
long-term debt then must be mentioned the fact that the level of short-term debt represents 
only 15 %- 16 % of total debt, the rest is long-term debt. Ratio of short-term debt in total 
capital slightly increased in 2008 and then decreased in 2009. At the same time the ratio of 
long-term debt registered a very slow but stable increase during 2007-2009. We can conclude 
from this that in the crisis it was mainly reduced the availability of short-term financing, while 
long-term financing was still possible. But of course, not at the levels that were before.  
The level of short-term debt was also analyzed for companies belonging to different 
industries. The most leveraged are the companies from consumer goods industry, less 
leveraged are companies from oil and gas industry. Long-term debt was highest for companies 
belonging to customer services industry and lowest for the companies of oil and gas industry. 
Also was interesting to observe if there is some connection between level of debt for different 
industries and quotations on the financial markets. The result is that DJIA index is generally 
higher for the least leveraged companies and its values are currently increasing independent of 
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the evolution of debt over capital for each industry. 
 
4.2 Testing the Pecking Order Hypothesis. 
 
The sample for testing the pecking order hypothesis comprises a number of 180 observations. 
There are 60 USA companies from 6 industries analyzed for a period of three years (2007, 
2008, and 2009). Since some of the variables used for testing the hypothesis of this study 
represent differences between years, some data from 2006 will also be used. This way the 
study will comprise a bigger period of time and some information from the period when the 
companies were in a relatively stable position. We have a three time period interval 2007-
2006, 2008-2007, and 2009-2008. The descriptive statistics of the variables used for testing 
this hypothesis can be seen in the Annex 3, at the back of this paper.  
One of the most important variables of this hypothesis is the deficit variable. In the table 10 
bellow we can see descriptive statistics of this variable for the analyzed period of time (2007-
2009). In the crisis situation only 5 (8, 33%) firms out of 60, that are analyzed in this study, 
didn‟t had a deficit, all the others encountered problems with financing during 2007-2009. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistic for the deficit variable. Years 2007, 2008, and 2009 (mil. dollars). 
Year Mean Std. dev. Minimum  Maximum 
2007 501,61 1192,90 0,00 8110,70 
2008 790,44 2638,20 0,00 19710,00 
2009 362,07 816,98 0,00 4299,00 
 
In 2008 the companies encountered the highest level of deficit in comparison with 2007 and 
2009. On average the companies had a deficit of 790, 44 millions of dollars in 2008, with a 
maximum of 19 710 millions of dollars. This is a more than twice increase in comparison with 
2007. The deficit that American companies had in 2008 decreased significantly in 2009. The 
funds deficit decreased from 790, 44 mil. dollars to 362, 07 mil. dollars in 2009, with a 
standard deviation of only 816, 98 and a maximum of 4 299 mil. dollars. This is mostly a 
result of the companies policy change. Their management has been orientated to the reduction 
of the deficit through sale of assets, backing from new projects and investments, cutting off 
the expenses and in some cases reduction of the production. The end of 2009 brought a 
stabilization of the financial markets but this didn‟t have a positive effect on the availability of 
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credits as we saw from the previous section. 
Following the methodology of Frank and Goyal (2003) I have tested the regression against the 
different dependent variables such as net debt issuance, gross debt issuance and other debt 
level variables. For this I used panel data. In order to correct for possible endogenity dummy 
variables for the year are also included, but they are not significant and don‟t affect the results 
of this study. The other debt level variables used are the following: 
  LTDR – Long-term active debt divided by the sum of total debt and book value of equity    
capital. 
  MLTDR - Long-term active debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of 
equity capital. 
  LTDRA –Long-term liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. 
  TDRA - Total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. 
From the table 11 we can see that in the regression PO1 the financing deficit variable is highly 
significant and an increase of one percentage point in financial deficit will lead to an increase 
of 0,285 percentage point of net debt issued. This does not seem to support the pecking order 
theory as the financial deficit will not be financed so much by debt issue. Also the beta in 
regression PO1 of 0, 2848 forces us to statistically reject the null hypothesis that βPO=1. R
2 
in 
the case of panel data is not reliable and might give us distorted result. 
As concluded from regression PO2 the use of an alternative dependent variable such as gross 
debt issued do not seem to offer any wider explanatory power. This is consistent with Bond 
and Scott (2006). 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Pecking Order Tests - ΔDit = α + βPODEFit + εit. 
  
Net debt 
issue 
Gross debt 
issue  LTDR MLTDR TDRA LTDRA 
 
PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 PO5 PO6 
Constant, α -21,0003 1135,31*** 0,3326*** 0,2421*** 0,5597*** 0,3268*** 
 
(56,9306) (195,969) (0,0332) (0,0275) (0,0284) (0,0244) 
Financing 
deficit, βPO 0,2848*** 0,5932*** -1,60E-05 -1,03E-05 -1,59E-05* -5,67E-06 
 
(0,0189) (0,0652) (1,10E-05) (9,15E-06) (9,46E-06) (8,14E-06) 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
 
R
2 
0,5695 0,3242 0,0137 0,0125 0,0164 0,0042 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. Dependent variables are shown in the X-axis and the independent variables are shown in the 
Y-axis of the table. 
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A conventional method being used by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) are to scale the variables with net assets. By doing this controlling for firm size can be 
done. In regression PO5 and PO6 we have therefore scaled the long-term liabilities and total 
liabilities with net assets. Scaling with net assets does not seem to offer a better explanatory 
power. Long-term active debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity 
capital as the dependent variable also does not offer a wide explanatory power. 
In order to better understand the evolution of the level of debt and deficit in the current crisis I 
will test the hypothesis of the pecking order for each year separately, by using cross-section 
data. From the previous table we have seen that the most significant measures of debt are net 
debt issue and gross debt issue. It is important to be aware of the risk that the scaling variables 
might be correlated with some of the regressed variables. If that is true we might manipulate 
the coefficients. Therefore I have chosen not to take the risk of affecting the coefficients and 
further testing will mainly be un-scaled. 
The results are presented in the table 12 bellow. 
 
Table 12. Pecking Order Tests - ΔDit = α + βPODEFit + εit, by using cross-section data for each year 
separately. 
  Net debt issue Gross debt 
 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Constant, 
α -81,1678 49,7483 -56,2 673,717*** 865,646*** 871,545*** 
 
(77,2861) (54,7814) (45,2282) (152,201) (183,819) (262,16) 
Financing 
deficit, 
βPO 0,3221*** 0,2679*** 0,3821*** 0,6634*** 0,5090*** 1,3217*** 
 
(0,0601) (0,02) (0,051) (0,1185) (0,0673) (0,2954) 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R
2 
0,3309 0,7549 0,4921 0,351 0,4968 0,2565 
      *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are  
given in parenthesis. Dependent variables are shown in the X-axis and the independent variables are shown 
in the Y-axis of the table. 
 
In the case when the dependent variable is the net debt issue we can see that the financing 
deficit is significant for all the years at 99% confidence level. We can see that in 2007, one 
million dollars increase in the level of financing deficit would lead to an increase in the net 
debt issue of 0, 3221 million dollars. This number went down to 0, 2679 million dollars in 
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2008 as a result of the tightening of the credit conditions. The companies were financing its 
deficit from other sources than long-term debt. In 2009, an increase of 1 mil. dollars in the 
level of financing deficit would lead to an increase in the level of net debt issue of 0, 3821 
mil. dollars. This result is quite interesting but is in line with the findings of this study from 
before. The dependent variable of this regression is the change in the issue of long-term debt, 
and as is possible to observe from table 7, that the long-term debt to capital ratio registered a 
very slight but stable increase in the years 2007-2009. The crisis generally reduced the 
availability of credits, but more affected was short-term lending. Long-term lending 
registered, although more slowly, a stable increase.  
We can see that the financial deficit managed to explain about 75 % of the variation in the net 
issue of long-term debt in 2008. This number was smaller in 2007 and 2009 which shows us 
that there is still a lot of unexplained variation in the net issue of debt. Also for 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 we statistically reject the null hypothesis βPO=1. 
In the case when the dependent variable is the gross issue of debt we can see that for all the 
years the deficit variable and constant are highly significant at 99% of confidence. In 2009, an 
increase in the financing deficit of a company of 1 mil. dollars would lead to an increase in 
the issue of long-term debt of 1, 32 mil. dollars. Also very interesting is the fact that in this 
case we can‟t reject the null hypothesis that the financing deficit was financed entirely by debt 
issuance. From the previous tables we can see that the level of deficit that the firms had in 
2009 decreased, and the level of long-term debt increased. Also the companies were not able 
to finance their cash needs from short-term debt issue. This could explain the result that was 
obtained. If we look at unadjusted R
2
 it is possible to observe that this regression has a lower 
explanatory power than the case when explained variable is net debt issue. We can conclude 
that there is still a lot of variation in the level of debt that can‟t be explained and there are a lot 
of variables that could also explain the changes in debt level and influence the results of our 
study. 
We have in the previous theoretical section made assumptions about net deficit being a 
component of a number of cash flow based components. In table 13 one can see whether this 
aggregated variable is justified empirically. Consistent with table 13 we can see that the use of 
alternative dependent variables, particularly gross debt issue, does not offer a wider 
explanatory power.  
In regression PO7 the null hypothesis of βDIV=βI=βW=βC=1 is being statistically rejected. This 
has been tested with an F-test on a five percent level. In the case of PO7 the aggregation step 
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does not seem to be supportive. Increase in dividend and working capital influence the 
increase in net debt only by a small amount. The increase in dividends also does not cause a 
significant increase in net level of debt. Also should be mentioned that a lot of American 
companies do not pay any dividend to its shareholders.  
 The net internal cash flow coefficient has the expected sign whereas an increase in internal 
cash flows of 1 mil. dollars would result in a net debt reduction of 0, 0627 mil. dollars. In the 
trade-off theory there is also a prediction of a positive relationship between investments and 
debt. Therefore these conclusions are not unique for the pecking order theory which is also 
noticed by Frank and Goyal (2003). 
 
Table 13. The Justification of the Aggregation Step - ΔDit = α + βDIVDIVit + βIIit + βWΔWit – βCCit + εit.  
  
Net debt 
issue 
Gross debt 
issue  LTDR MLTDR TDRA LTDRA 
 
PO7 PO8 PO9 PO10 PO11 PO12 
const -39,1824 886,779*** 0,3384*** 0,2497*** 0,5667*** 0,3310*** 
 
(66,4993) (164,434) (0,0337) (0,0277) (0,02876) (0,0248) 
DIV 0,0391 3,4248*** -0,0001 -0,0002* -0,0001 -7,71E-05 
 
(0,2079) (0,5142) (0,0001) (8,66E-05) 8,95E-05 7,75E-05 
∆W 0,1665*** 0,3884*** -8,46E-06 3,38E-05 -2,12E-05 -2,54E-05 
 
(0,059) (0,1461) 
(2,9938-
E05) 2,46E-05 2,54E-05 2,20E-05 
I 0,1362*** 0,0189 -1,90E-05 -9,18E-06 -1,86E-05 -1,17E-05 
 
0,0311 0,0678 1,5747-E05 1,29E-05 1,34E-05 1,16E-05 
C -0,0627*** -0,0264 -3,90E-06 -6,31E-06 -5,38E-06 -4,83E-06 
 
0,0167 0,0412 8,45E-06 6,94E-06 7,18E-06 6,22E-06 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R
2 
0,4411 0,5473 0,0351 0,0476 0,0506 0,0269 
*** significant at 1% level,  ** significant at 5% level,  * significant at  10% level. Standard errors are 
given in parenthesis. Dependent variables are shown in the X-axis and the independent variables are shown 
in the Y-axis of the table. 
 
In the equation PO8 the dependent variable is the gross issue of debt. Having this variable as 
dependent does not seem to add to the regression any additional explanatory power. The most 
significant change is in the fact that dividend variable is significant and an increase of 1 mil. 
dollars in the level of dividends would lead to an increase in the level of gross debt of 0, 388 
mil. dollars. In regression PO8 the null hypothesis of βDIV=βI=βW=βC=1 is being also 
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statistically rejected. 
In what follows I will also test the pecking order hypothesis in its aggregate form for each 
year separately by using the cross-section data. The analyzed dependent variables, as in the 
previous case will be net debt issue and gross debt issue. 
As we can see from table 14, the aggregate step seems to offer an additional explanatory 
power in the case when the dependant variable is the gross debt issue. The variables of the 
regression explain 43% in 2007 and 76% in 2008 of the variation in the issue of gross debt. 
This is a quite high number. Also in 2008 almost all the variables are significant at 90% and 
99% of confidence except the net investment variable. In 2009 we can see that the 
explanatory power of the regression has decreased, dividend and changes in working capital 
variable are not significant anymore. But, even when we analyze the data for each year 
separately we cannot accept the null hypothesis of pecking order theory. 
 
Table 14. The Justification of the Aggregation Step - ΔDit = α + βDIVDIVit + βIIit + βWΔWit – βCCit + εit  
by using cross-section data for each year separately. 
  Net debt issue Gross debt 
 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
const -18,9838 43,3772 -15,6715 658,225*** 570,117*** 634,919*** 
 
72,3516 69,3296 53,6591 144,9 135,903 193,266 
DIV -0,2489 0,5026 -0,7316 2,1698*** 5,5256*** 0,8944 
 
0,3352 0,389 0,473 0,6713 0,7625 1,7038 
∆W -0,0171 0,2119** 0,2603** -0,2115 0,3510* 0,0927 
 
0,147 0,0964 0,1204 0,2945 0,1889 0,4335 
I -0,1164 0,2199** 0,2028** 0,1662 0,2312 1,0529*** 
 
0,0818 0,0889 0,0968 0,1638 0,1793 0,3485 
C -0,1567*** -0,0188 -0,0978*** 0,0095 0,1713* -0,3506*** 
 
0,034 0,0469 0,0357 0,0682 0,0919 0,1286 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R
2 
0,4371 0,6623 0,3381 0,4353 0,7634 0,6259 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. Dependent variables are shown in the X-axis and the independent variables are shown in the 
Y-axis of the table. 
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After testing for the pecking order theory I can formulate a series of conclusions regarding the 
obtained results. First should be mentioned that almost all USA companies encountered 
problems with financing of their activity (83, 3% out of 100% had a financing deficit). The 
maximum deficit level was attained in 2008. For testing the pecking order hypothesis is used 
panel and cross-section data. Common problems found in panel data are detected in this 
sample; the ordinary least square (OLS) assumption of independent errors is unlikely to be 
satisfied. The most serious problem of OLS estimation comes from the dependence of the 
residuals. Residuals show the presence of autocorrelation and homoskedasticity. The problem 
of dependent errors seems to be more important with this data set than that of outliers. In 
order to somehow correct for the problems found in the data I use year as dummy variables 
but this variables are not significant and do not influence the results of the study. 
When using panel data the results do not seem to support the pecking order theory. Also the 
use of alternative dependent variables does not seem to add any explanatory power. 
Performing the pecking order regression for each year separately, by using cross-section data, 
does not provide also any support for the POH. But from the table 12, we can see that in 2008, 
75% of the variation in the net issue of long term debt is explained by the financing deficit. So 
the main reason for issue of the debt in the worst year of crisis was the financing deficit. In 
2007 and 2009 this number is much lower so there are other reasons explaining the change in 
long-term debt issue. The case when the dependent variable is the gross debt issue supports 
the POH for the year 2009. From the previous analysis we can see that the level of deficit in 
2009 decreased, and the level of long-term debt increased. Also the companies were not able 
to finance their cash needs from short-term debt issue. This could explain the result that was 
obtained. 
The tested net deficit variable is a component of a number of cash flow based components. In 
order to see if the aggregated step is justified I tested it for pecking order hypothesis. We can 
see that the aggregation step does not seem to be supportive for the tested hypothesis and the 
use of other dependent variables also. As in the previous case when we use cross-section data 
for each year separately the gross issue of debt is explained better by the aggregated variables 
than net issue of debt.  
 
4.3 Testing the Trade-off Hypothesis 
 
In the trade-off theory it is assumed that the firm will adjust to a target debt level in order to 
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achieve an optimal capital structure. The main objective of the partial adjustment model used 
here is to see if there is an adjustment towards an optimal level, and if so what is the speed of 
this adjustment. 
The model and the variables for testing this hypothesis were discussed in the chapter before. 
Also the descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in the Annex 4, at the end of this 
paper. 
Table 15 shows results of instrumental variable estimations controlling for time-invariant and 
firm-invariant unobserved variables (time and firm fixed effects) of the partial adjustment 
model. It summarizes also the core regression results of Flannery/Rangan (2006) shown in 
their Table 2, model 7, and compares them to a similar regression for the firm sample 
presented in this paper. 
Similar to Flannery/Rangan (2006), I include a dummy indicating if U.S. firms from the 
period 2007-2009 did not report research & development expenditures (R&D), and set in this 
case the variable to zero. This serves to avoid biases from the fact that reporting R&D 
expenditures is voluntary under the U.S. accounting standards. Model also includes a rating 
dummy since the rating agencies played an important role at the various stages of the 
subprime crisis and influenced the availability of credits to the companies. 
In the model the dependent variable is market leverage. All regressor variables are lagged one 
year. Year dummies have been included. Depreciation and R&D expenditure are divided by 
total assets. 
In this model I am trying to explain firm‟s level of leverage in the analyzed period and 
according to the specified above model it depends on the firm‟s situation from the previous 
years. Particularly is dependent on the level of leverage it has already had and on a set of 
other variables describing the firm‟s characteristics. As we can see from the table 15 not all 
these variables are significant in the sample of United States firms (2007-2009), so not all of 
them account for the change in the level of debt. This might be due to a small number of 
observations in the sample and a limited time period. Smaller sample size and a greater 
number of independent variables decrease the likelihood of finding statistically significant 
results. 
Still, from our results we can see that the constant is significant at 95% confidence and also 
the lagged market leverage is significant at 95% of confidence. What is interesting is the 
negative correlation between the lagged market leverage and the dependent variable market 
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leverage. The negative sign on lagged leverage suggests that mean reversion is at work as 
predicted by the tradeoff theory. 
 
Table 15.  Flannery/Rangan (2006) regression results and instrumental variables with fixed effects 
regression for United States firms, 2007-2009. 
Regressors 
Instrumental Variable 
Regression, 
Fixed Effects (U.S. firms 
2007-2009) 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Instrumental 
Variable Regression, Fixed 
Effects (U.S. firms) 
Constant 2,470 (0,931)**  - 
Lagged Market Leverage  -0,329 (0,156)** 0,656 (0.000)*** 
Profitability  -0,275 (201) -0,030 (0.000) *** 
Size -0,265 (0,119) 0,025 (0.000) *** 
Market-to -Book 0,002 (0,021) ** 0,000 (0.418) *** 
Tangibility 0,129 (0,223) 0,053 (0.000) *** 
Industry Median Debt - 0,034 (0.000) *** 
Depreciation -1,438 (1,541) -0,226 (0.000) *** 
Expected Inflation 7,775 (2,069)*** - 
R&D Expenditure  1,821 (1,384) -0,025 (0.000) *** 
No R&D Expenditure Reported 
 [Dummy] - 0,000 (0.010) *** 
Firm is Rated [Dummy] - 0,003 (0.087)* 
n 120 111 106 
R-squared 0,96 0,466 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. 
 
One percentage point increase in the market leverage in the previous year leads to a decrease 
in the same value in the current year of 0,329 percentage point. This shows us that the 
companies are decreasing their level of debt quite fast in the analyzed crisis period. The sign 
is opposite for this variable in the Flannery and Rangan model including the U.S. companies 
for the period 1987-2006, that is the period before crisis. 
We can see that in the case of profitability, although in the 2007-2009 sample is not 
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significant, it has the same sign as in the Flannery and Rangan model. Higher profitability 
lowers the level of market debt in companies. The results are different for size variable, seems 
that it has an opposite effect on the level of market debt in companies in the crisis period than 
in the period before (but again, the variable is not significant). 
Market-to-book variable is significant at 95% of confidence and positively influences the 
level of debt in the next period. One percentage point increase in the market-to-book variable 
will lead to an increase in the level of debt of 0,002 percentage point. This variable is not 
influencing the level of debt in the Flannery and Rangan model. Industry median debt is not 
reported in the current sample although in the U.S. firms (1987-2006) sample is highly 
significant. 
Expected inflation is significant at 99% of confidence and it manages to predict pretty well 
the level of leverage of the companies. A one percentage point increase in the expected 
inflation will lead to an increase in the market leverage of 7, 77 percentage points in the next 
period. This measure is not reported in the Flannery/Rangan sample. R&D expenditure is not 
significant in the crisis sample, although it is significant in the pre-crisis sample. 
As we can see from the table 15, column 3 the no R&D expenditures reported dummy and 
rated dummy are highly significant. In the crisis sample these variables are omitted due to 
exact collinearity. I include in the model also year dummies as I expect that different 
economic conditions in the analyzed years might lead to different leverage behavior. These 
dummies should show how much more or less leverage a firm took previous to a specific year. 
But as it turns out in our model the year dummies are not significant and do not change the 
results of the regression. 
Unadjusted R squared is also reported with a high value of 0, 96 in the current sample and 
only 0, 46 in the Flannery/Rangan sample. But measures of goodness of fit aren't useful at all 
for evaluating a model in panel data with fixed effects; tossing in lots of fixed effects is 
inflating R-squared.  
In terms of the Flannery/Rangan (2006) results in column 3, most of the firm characteristics 
Xit that determine the target capital structure are highly significant after controlling for the 
lagged market debt ratio, which supports the existence of target leverage. According to the 
estimated coefficient on MDRit, the speed of adjustment is λ=1-0,656 = 0,344, thus 
significantly different from zero in a statistical and economic sense. Hence, about 34 % of the 
deviation from optimal leverage is eliminated in each period, taking about three years for the 
average firm to adjust to its target capital structure following shocks. 
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The corresponding estimation results for United States firms in the crisis period , (column 2) 
show that the adjustment speed is much faster, 132,9% (λ =1- (-0,329) = 1,329). In the 
theoretical part I talked about the fact that if λ=1 then the speed of adjustment is infinitely 
high and the debt ratio is always at its targeted value. So the firms in our sample are adjusting, 
but it seems that the firms are not adjusting to their targeted debt level but are reducing their 
level of debt way below the optimal level, by this trying to have as less as possible leverage in 
their capital structure. In this way the companies will not benefit anymore from the tax shield 
that arises from the fact of having debt. At the same time I cannot say that this is wrong as in 
the current situation the cost of bankruptcy also increased a lot and this might off-set the 
benefits obtained from having leverage. 
Similar to Flannery/Rangan (2006), I use firm fixed effects model which explain a large 
proportion of the cross-sectional variation of the market debt ratio of U.S. firms (2007-2009). 
Ignoring firm-individual effects would lead to much lower adjustment speed estimates and a 
miss-specified model, emphasizing the need to take the panel nature of the data into account. 
In addition to this type of dynamic adjustment behavior analysis as shown by the 
Flannery/Rangan (2006) study, some studies unite a theoretical and empirical analysis. The 
theoretical models are constructed in such a manner that they take in consideration as many 
stylized facts as possible, but also produce new hypotheses. The firm behavior which is 
theoretically derived is then replicated, generating data with known properties of the firms‟ 
capital structure determinants. After that the data is then used to test the characteristics of 
standard econometric estimators. 
There is a current model of this type of analysis. In their paper Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) 
show a dynamic trade-off model which includes firm investments determined by product 
market changes, burden costs of having financial distress, and debt-holder/equity-holder 
agency problems. They reproduce model-generated panel data for leverage ratios, cash flows 
and investment choices and perform partial adjustment regressions as in Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) and others. In this case, the speed of adjustment is around 7, 1% under realistic 
parameter settings. This result is close to the estimates from the real world measured by 
Fama/French (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007), but slower than the estimate by 
Flannery/Rangan (2006). Besides, Titman/Tsyplakov (2007) demonstrates that there is a 
strong connection between the equity returns of firms and their debt ratios. 
As it was mentioned before the main scope of this model is to see if firm will adjust to a target 
debt level in order to achieve an optimal capital structure and also, if this adjustment is 
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present, what is the speed of it. The significant variables of this regression are lagged market 
leverage, market-to-book leverage and expected inflation, so as we can see some of the firm 
characteristics that determine the target capital structure are significant after controlling for 
the lagged market debt ratio, which supports the existence of target leverage. The negative 
sign on lagged leverage suggests that mean reversion is at work as predicted by the tradeoff 
theory. Market-to-book variable and expected inflation positively influences the level of debt 
in the next period. 
In this model the speed of adjustment is very high. The companies are reducing their level of 
debt way below the optimal level, by this trying to have as less as possible leverage in their 
capital structure. But again as it was said cost of bankruptcy also increased a lot and we 
cannot say for sure what the optimal level of debt is. 
 
4.3.1 Testing the dynamic partial-adjustment model with inclusion of 
macroeconomic factors 
 
In this section I estimate the capital structure adjustment speed based on the integrated 
dynamic partial adjustment model with the inclusion of macroeconomic variables. The results 
are illustrated in table 16. Macroeconomic factors are term spread, default spread, GDP 
growth rate and price-output ratio. In this model I am trying to see whether adding a 
macroeconomic variable to the model will increase the robustness of the results and will offer 
a better explanation of the adjustment speed of capital structure in the times of recession. The 
expected inflation is excluded from the regression since it wipes out the effects of 
macroeconomic variables. 
From the table we can observe that a significant change of the results did not occur. From the 
firm characteristics Xit, that determine the target capital structure are significant the previous 
year market debt ratio and size of the firm variables. Together with the macroeconomic 
determinants (which are highly significant) these variables determine the level of debt in a 
given year. Notable is the fact that with the inclusion of macroeconomic variables the size of 
the firms became a significant determinant of the level of debt. The term spread, which is 
defined as the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rate, is positively 
correlated with the level of debt in the next year. An increase in the level of term spread could 
be due to a decrease in the short-term interest rate or an increase in the long-term rates. But 
since the level of funds available to the firms increases as the term spread increases it would 
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be logical to suppose that this happens because a decrease in the short-term interest rates. So 
an increase in the short-term interest would lead to a decrease in the level of debt available to 
the firms, fact that is in concordance with the actual economic conditions. The inclusion of 
other macroeconomic determinants does not change the results of the model. 
 
Table 16. The dependent variable is Market Leverage. All the regressors are lagged one year. Each 
regression includes a macroeconomic indicator. The second column is regressed by adding term spread 
variable as a macroeconomic indicator, third column by adding default spread variable, forth column by 
using the GDP growth rate and fifth column uses the price-output ratio as a macroeconomic factor. 
Regressors 
Fixed effects regression with macroeconomic factors 
Term spread Default spread GDP growth rate Price-output ratio 
     
Constant 2,674 (0,968)*** 2,611(0,957)*** 2,85 (0,003)*** 15,625(4,191)*** 
Lagged Market 
Leverage  -0,329 (0,156)** -0,329 (0,156)** -0,329 (0,155)** -0,329(0,156)** 
Profitability  -0,275 (0,201) -0,274(0,200) -0,274 (0,201) -0,274(0,200) 
Size -0,265(0,118)** -0,265(0,118)** -0,265(0,118)** -0,265(0,118)** 
Market-to -Book 0,002 (0,021) 0,001(0,021) -0,002(0,021) 0,002(0,021) 
Tangibility 0,129 (0,223) 0,128(0,222) 0,128(0,222) 0,128(0,223) 
Depreciation -1,438 (1,541) -1,438(1,540) -1,438(1,540) -1,438(1,541) 
R&D Expenditure  1,821(1,384) 1,821(1,384) 1,821(1,384) 1,821(1,384) 
Macroeconomic factor 3,186(0,848)*** 8,736(2,325)*** -3,112(0,828)*** 
-1,22E+011 
(3,25E+010)*** 
n 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. 
 
From the table 16 we can see that the GDP growth rate and price-output ratio from the 
previous year are negatively correlated with the market leverage. So a higher growth ratio of 
the economy and a higher ratio of stock price over GDP lead to a decrease in the credit funds 
available to the real sector companies. 
The adjustment speed of the capital structure is the same as in the previous model (table 15), 
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this way the inclusion of macroeconomic variables does not change the adjustment path or 
speed of capital structure. One of the reasons might be that the impact of macroeconomic 
factors on the company‟s capital structure is too small and is wiped out in the analysis due to 
the use of many regressors. 
 
4.4 Testing the conventional model 
 
As it was mentioned before the conventional leverage regression is more orientated to explain 
the level of leverage while the change in this variable is better explained by the pecking-order 
model. One of the assumptions of this type of regression is that shocks are uncorrelated across 
years and this assumption is unlikely to be literally correct. Having the condition stated above 
allows us to run the conventional specifications in first differences. When we run a regression 
in first differences then we can expect to lose some accuracy and a lower R
2
 to be obtained. A 
problem in using first differences is that it may bias the variable coefficients towards zero. But 
as it will be seen from further analysis this bias is not large enough to alter the conclusions of 
the regression. 
The most important in testing this model are the following four factors: tangibility of assets, 
market-to-book ratio, log sales and profitability, I also add the expected inflation variable. The 
measure of industry median debt will not be included in the regression because of lack of 
data. The following test basically has the scope to see how the financing deficit works when 
added to a conventional leverage regression. 
The results of the OLS regression are presented in the table 17. The dummies for the year are 
also included but are jointly insignificant in all regressions. Hence, time-variant factors that 
are common to all firms (like the interest rate level and other macro variables) do not affect 
capital structure choices in United States.  
 
Table 17. The dependent variable is market leverage. All regressed variables are lagged one year in the 
third column. In several specifications, the basic regression is augmented with the financing deficit. Year 
dummies have been included. It is an OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Regressors 
OLS Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0,778 (0,094)*** 0,732 (0,099)*** 0,479 (0,165)*** 
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Profitability  -0,085 (0,067) -0,078 (0,067) -0,206 (0,013)** 
Size -0,006 (0,010)  -0,002 (0,012) 0,021 (0,013) 
Market-to -Book -0,158 (0,015)*** -0,158 (0,015)*** -0,119 (0,017)*** 
Tangibility -0,052 (0,061) -0,036 (0,062) 0,091 (0,077) 
Expected Inflation 0,075 (0,695) 0,184 (0,697) 0,055 (3,249) 
Deficit 
 
-1,11E-05 (7,76E-06)  -1,89E-05 (8,46E-06)**  
n 180 180 120 
R-squared 0,456 0,462 0,460 
F-test 24,17 (0,000)*** 21,13 (0,000)*** 16,079 (0,000)*** 
F-test fixed effects     
  
In the table 18 below are presented the signs of the variables obtained by Frank and Goyal 
(2007) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) for the US firms in the periods of time before crisis. In 
the table market-to-book ratio and profitability are negatively correlated with the market 
leverage and size and tangibility have positive signs. 
As we can see from the table 17 (column 1) the estimated coefficients on the market-to-book 
assets ratio, tangibility, firm size, and profitability do not have the usual predicted signs. The 
coefficient signs are negative on the market-to-book ratio, on tangibility, on log of sales, and 
negative on profitability. The only variable that has a positive correlation with the market 
leverage is expected inflation. 
 
Table 18. Sign RZ/FG is the sign of the coefficient estimate found in Rajan/Zingales (1995) and 
Frank/Goyal (2007) for the United States. 
 
Sign RZ Sign FG 
Profitability  [-] [-] 
Size [+] [+] 
Market-to -Book [-] [-] 
Tangibility [+] [+] 
Industry Median Debt 
 
[+] 
Expected Inflation 
 
[+] 
 
A rise in any of these variables will lead to a decrease in market-debt ratio. This proves once 
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more that in the period of time 2007-2009 U.S. companies are actively reducing their level of 
debt despite any increase in those indicators of firm performance that usually stimulate the 
debt. In the first column only the market-to-book variable is significant in determining the 
level of market debt but at the same time the model explains 45, 6% of the variation in the 
market leverage which is a quite high value. 
In the second column of the OLS regression the financing deficit variable is added as an 
explanatory variable. If the pecking order were the key driver, it should have wiped out the 
effects of the conventional variables. It did not do so. Adding the deficit variable to the 
regression did not have much effect on the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients on 
the conventional variable. Also, in this regression the financing deficit is not empirically 
relevant. 
In column (3), the leverage regression is re-estimated by lagging the regressor variables one-
year. This fact changes the results of the regression a lot. The coefficients of the variables 
now have the expected signs corresponding to Rajan/ Zingales (1995) and Frank/Goyal 
(2007) results. The coefficient signs are negative on the market-to-book ratio, positive on 
tangibility, positive on log of sales, and negative on profitability. Also the sign is positive on 
expected inflation variable. The significance of the regression variables also changes. Market-
to-book variable is highly significant as usual and in addition to this the profitability and 
financing deficit variable are significant at 95% of confidence. An increase in profitability of 
the firm would lead to a decrease in market leverage. Also the deficit variable and the market-
to-debt ratio are negatively correlated. This fact demonstrates that in the current situation if 
the companies have a deficit of funds they will not cover this deficit by debt. As in the 
previous case the deficit variable did not wiped out the effects of other conventional variables. 
Nevertheless, the financing deficit is empirically relevant although the value of the coefficient is 
very small. 
If we look back at the table 5, there are presented the signs of the coefficients of the variables 
which support the pecking-order theory and the trade-off theory. The sign of the profitability 
coefficient supports the pecking–order theory, but at the same time the sign of the market-to-
book ratio and tangibility supports the trade-off theory. Also there are some discussions that 
the positive sign on the coefficient of tangibility variable might support as well the pecking-
order theory. The coefficient of log of sales has a positive sign and this is consistent with the 
both competing theories. 
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It is interesting to observe R
2 
along the whole three regressions. Adding the financing deficit 
and adding lagged variables adds amazingly little to the results of the fitted equations once the 
conventional factors are taken into account. This is in line with Fama and French (2002) who 
dispute that mean reversion in corporate leverage is surprisingly weak. 
Until now pooled OLS was used to test the conventional model, however, Huang/Ritter 
(2007) find that applying pooled OLS leads to upward biased coefficient estimates and 
applying fixed effects estimation leads to a downward bias of the estimate. Furthermore, the 
bias with fixed effects estimation increases the smaller the time dimension of the data. 
Anyhow, the most efficient way to deal with endogenity and heterogeneity is to use fixed 
effects regression. ,, A simple fixed effects panel estimator would be robust, because the 
dummy variables included to control for the individual effect automatically control for any 
time-invariant variable. This constitutes a compelling reason to employ panel estimators 
wherever possible. It also makes a strong argument to use fixed effects (or estimators based 
on first-differencing) rather than random effects estimators, because random effects require 
that the regression‟s other explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual effects 
“(Greene 2003, chap. 13). This fixed effects estimator is consistent in the standard panel 
framework, for the reason that it takes out the common, time invariant and firm-specific 
element in the regression‟s error term. 
Table 19 summarizes the results of fixed effects regressions of the conventional model. 
Dummy for the year are also included in the fixed effects regression and they are significant.  
So in the table 19 are presented the fixed effects regressions (first, second and third column) 
for non-financial United States firms in the period from 2007 to 2009. In all regressions, the 
market-value-based debt ratio is regressed on a set of explanatory variables that have been 
used by Rajan/Zingales (1995). As it was mentioned before, in all regressions dummy 
variables for the year of the observation are included (in order to avoid collinearity I am 
omitting one year). The fixed-effects estimator includes a set of indicator variables (dummies) 
for all companies instead of the common intercept term. 
As we can see from the column 1 the coefficients of the variables do not have the usual 
expected signs as predicted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2007). The 
coefficient signs are negative on log of sales, market-to-book and tangibility variables. It is 
positive on the profitability and expected inflation variable. Not all the coefficients of the 
regression are significant. In the first column only market-to-book and size variables are 
significant at 99% of confidence and affect the level of market leverage of the firms. 
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In the second column of the table 19 is added an addition variable in order to estimate the 
market debt of the companies. This variable is the financing deficit and as we observe the 
inclusion of this variable does not influence the results of the regression by too much. If the 
pecking order theory would have been the main determinant that influence the way a 
company finances its operation then the deficit variable had to wipe out the effects of the 
conventional variables. But it did not do so and the deficit variable is not even significant. 
These results do not support the pecking-order theory concerning the structure of firm 
financing in the analyzed period of time. The coefficients of variables, as in the regression 
before, do not have the usual expected signs. Market-to-book variable, log of sales, tangibility 
and expected inflation are negatively correlated with the market leverage. A positive 
relationship is presented only in the case of profitability and deficit variable. The most 
important variables in terms of the magnitude are size and market-to-book ratio. 
 
 
Table 19. The dependent variable is market leverage. All regressor variables are lagged one year in the 
third column. In several specifications, the basic regression is augmented with the financing deficit. Year 
dummies have been included. It is a fixed effects regression with standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Regressors 
Fixed Effects Regression  
(1) (2) 
(3) 
Constant 2,455 (0,536)*** 2,6 (0,549)*** 2,618 (0,921)*** 
Profitability  0,066 (0,136) 0,1 (0,139) -0,239 (0,185) 
Size -0,219 (0,065)*** -0,238 (0,068)*** -0,311 (0,121)** 
Market-to -Book -0,09(0,016)*** -0,09 (0,016)*** 0,025 (0,017) 
Tangibility -0,172 (0,145) -0,165 (0,145) 0,168 (0,231) 
Expected Inflation 0,019(0,387) -0,025 (0,389) 7,689 (2,132)*** 
Deficit 
 
6,13E-06 (5,34E-06) 5,32E-06 (4,89E-06) 
n 180 180 120 
R-squared 0,905 0,906 0,956 
F-test 16,67 (0,000)*** 16,48 (0,000)*** 18,139 (0,000)*** 
F-test fixed effects 9,11 (0,000)*** 9,03 (0,000)*** 10,719 (0,000)*** 
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According to the pecking-order theory the market-to-book variable and size variable should 
be positively correlated with the dependent variable and the profitability variable should be 
negatively correlated with the dependent one. As we can see the results are totally opposite 
which is another proof of the inconsistency of pecking-order theory. 
In the third column all the explanatory variables are lagged one year. If we compare the fixed 
effect regression with and without the financing deficit the results of the regression do not 
change almost at all. The deficit variable is not significant and the model does not support the 
pecking order theory although the profitability has the normal sign predicted by the pecking 
order theory (but then again the variable is not significant). The expected inflation variable is 
highly significant and has a positive sign as predicted by the trade-off theory. 
The presence of significant year dummy variables in both regressions implies that time-
variant factors that are common to all firms (for example interest rate level and other 
macroeconomic indicators) systematically affect capital structure choices in United States 
companies. 
When using the fixed effects regression we can test for the fixed effects. The null hypothesis 
is that all of the units share the same intercept.  The alternative is that they vary across units, 
so the way to test this is by running both models and then comparing their sum of squares in a 
joint F-test. In all three models from the table 18 we reject the null hypothesis. This indicates 
that firm-specific but time invariant variables (for example the industry affiliation) to be 
systematic determinants of capital structure choices for United States exchange listed 
companies. 
In the fixed effects regression is presented also R-squared. But measures of goodness of fit 
aren't useful at all for evaluating a model in panel data with fixed effects; tossing in lots of 
fixed effects is inflating R-squared. Also adding the financing deficit adds very little to the 
results of the fitted equations once account is taken of the conventional factors. 
As a general conclusion of the conventional model I can say that when analyzing capital 
structure issues is better using data that consist of a panel of firms repeatedly observed over 
time. Controlling for unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effects is a minimum necessity 
to the applied econometric method. Consequently, the fixed effects regression shown in table 
19, third column, constitutes the baseline model of the conventional regression, which can 
then be compared to the results of other methods that analyze capital structure.   
As it was mentioned before conventional model is orientated to explain the level of leverage 
and from the regression we can see that the most significant determinants in magnitude of the 
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market leverage are expected inflation and the size of the companies. An increase in the size 
of the companies will lead to a decrease in the market-debt ratio and an increase in the 
expected inflation would raise the level of debt of companies. Also the addition of deficit 
variable does not change the results of the regression and this fact does not support the 
pecking-order theory. The signs of the coefficients are not the same as were obtained by Rajan 
and Zingales and Frank/Goyal which are using the same regression for United States 
companies but only in the periods of time before the crisis. Also the significant coefficients 
signs support more the trade-off theory rather than pecking-order theory according to the 
general framework from this field. 
An important conclusion is that time-variant factors common to all firms affect capital 
structure choices (ex. macroeconomic situation) and firm-specific but time invariant variables 
(for example the industry affiliation) are determinants of capital structure choices for United 
States companies. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The crisis of 2007 and 2008 is one of the most severe in financial history. It was triggered by 
a liquidity crisis in the United States banking system and it has resulted in the collapse of 
large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments and downturns in 
stock markets around the world. Although the effects on the financial markets and institutions 
are of great interest, this paper has focused its attention on the effects the current crisis 
towards real sector companies from U.S.A. 
According to the hypotheses formulated at the beginning of the paper I start the analysis of 
firm‟s capital structure by investigating the level of debt and its evolution during the analyzed 
period of time. After analyzing the capital structure I get to the conclusion that first, the USA 
companies are not highly leveraged, and second, the debt that represented less than 50 % of 
the total assets in 2007 decreases by half until 2009.  Although some measure of leverage 
slightly increased in 2008, in 2009 they all went down.  By making a decomposition of total 
debt into long-term debt and short-term debt is possible to observe that during the crisis was 
mainly reduced the availability of short-term financing, while long-term financing registered 
only a very slight increase. These results are consistent with the predictions of the first 
hypothesis of the study. 
Having this in mind, I use then the pecking order theory and trade-off theory, with the help of 
which I test if traditional capital structure theories are able to empirically explain the 
composition of corporate capital structure. The test is based on the idea that if firms follow the 
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pecking order, then in a regression of net debt issues on the financing deficit, a slope 
coefficient of one is observed.When using panel data the results do not seem to support the 
pecking order theory. Performing the pecking order regression for each year separately, by 
using cross-section data, does not provide also any support for the POH. But from the table 
11, we can see that in 2008, 75% of the variation in the net issue of long term debt is 
explained by the financing deficit. So the main reason for issue of the debt in the worst year of 
crisis was the financing deficit. Although we get this result, we do not find that the financing 
deficit is actually financed by debt, moreover, from the previous tests we saw that the level of 
debt decreased. Also in the annex 2 is shown that the level of equity increased in this period, 
this could mean that the financing deficit in this period is financed less by debt and more by 
equity. 
In testing the trade-off theory, the selection of studies is based on Myers‟ (1984) insight, that 
the key question to differentiate between competing capital structure theories is whether firms 
adjust to some target following shocks to their capital structure. This is due to the fact, that 
trade-off theories suggest that firms try to maintain some “optimal” debt ratio.  The most 
important objective of capital structure study using dynamic partial adjustment models is to 
approximate the speed of adjustment. I complement the empirical models of studies on firms‟ 
adjustment behaviour to capital structure shocks by adding additional factors that may 
influence capital structure decisions, but have gained only recently attention in the literature. 
For instance, Kisgen (2006) considers for the first time the role of ratings from external rating 
agencies (like S&P or Moody‟s) in the capital structure context. This seems an important 
contribution due to the eminent role that rating agencies play in capital markets nowadays. 
Also I consider the effect of expected inflation on the speed of adjustment of capital structure. 
As it was mentioned before the main scope of this model is to see if firm will adjust to a target 
debt level in order to achieve an optimal capital structure and also, if this adjustment is 
present, what is the speed of it. I find out that mean reversion is at work as predicted by the 
trade-off theory and that the speed of adjustment is very high. The companies are reducing 
their level of debt way below the optimal level, by this trying to have as less as possible 
leverage in their capital structure.  
In order to estimate the impact of macroeconomic conditions of the economy on the 
adjustment speed of the capital structure I add to the Flannery and Rangan partial-adjustment 
model a set of macroeconomic variables. The results show that the inclusion of these variables 
does not change the adjustment path or speed of capital structure. 
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So it is clear that in the times of current crisis the companies are adjusting their capital 
structure fast in order to make a trade-off between the benefits of debt (tax shield, financial 
discipline) and the costs of debt (increased bankruptcy costs, agency costs).  
In order to increase the robustness of this paper finding, a conventional model is used to 
explain levels of debt. This is done by testing what sign the coefficients have and compare 
this to previous findings and the predicted outcome. The deficit variable is also added to the 
regression in order to test the pecking order theory even further. The financing deficit ought to 
wipe out the effects of other variables according to the pecking order theory. If the financing 
deficit is simply one factor among many that firms trade-off, then what is left is a generalized 
version of the trade-off theory. The current study finds that the financing deficit does not wipe 
out the effects of conventional variables. 
As it was mentioned before conventional model is orientated to explain the level of leverage 
and from the regression we can see that the most significant determinants in magnitude of the 
market leverage are expected inflation and the size of the companies. The signs of the 
coefficients are not the same as were obtained by Rajan and Zingales and Frank/Goyal which 
are using the same regression for United States companies but only in the periods of time 
before the crisis. Also the significant coefficients signs support more the trade-off theory 
rather than pecking-order theory according to the general framework from this field. 
An important conclusion is that time-variant factors common to all firms affect capital 
structure choices (ex. macroeconomic situation) and firm-specific but time invariant variables 
(for example the industry affiliation) are determinants of capital structure choices for United 
States companies. 
I use the conventional model in order to test the forth hypothesis of this study which says that 
profitability and debt should be inversely correlated in the time of crisis. From the findings we 
can see that indeed these two factors are negatively correlated but, the profitability variable is 
not significant in the tested regression and by this does not affect the level of debt in the tested 
model. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Annex 1. Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA) for 2007-2008 for industries. 
 
Basic Materials  
 
 
Consumer Goods 
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Industrials 
 
 
Technology 
 
 
Oil and Gas 
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Customer Services 
 
Source: The Wall Street Journal. Digital Network. 
 
 
Annex 2. Descriptive statistics for total assets and equity in the period 2007-2009. 
 
                         Assets 
  
2007 2008 2009 
Mean (%) 6601,8 7942,1 7851,0 
Median (%) 2642 2974,5 2890,4 
     
 
                         Equity 
  
2007 2008 2009 
Mean (%) 3283,7 3716,9 3846,0 
Median (%) 1109,9 1283,5 1350,6 
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Annex 3. Descriptive statistics for testing the pecking order hypothesis. 
 
Variables Mean  Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
∆D 141,35 661,59 -3097,1 5042,6 
DIV 131,46 355,25 0 2355,2 
∆W 66,23 664,92 -2587,6 4243,4 
I 257,16 1412,6 -4226,6 14668 
C 1190 4610,2 -3204 39925 
∆E 277,05 1374,7 -4226,6 14668 
LTDR 0,31 0,26 0 1,91 
MLTDR 0,22 0,21 0 0,99 
TTDRA 0,56 0,22 0,11 1,88 
LTDRA 0,31 0,19 -0,12 1,31 
LTD 1208,2 1817,7 0 10385 
DEF 551,37 1736,4 0 19710 
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Annex 4. Descriptive statistics for testing the trade-off hypothesis.  
 
Variables Mean  Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
 Market Leverage  0,41 0,23 0,02 1 
Profitability  0,203 0,213 -0,292 1,014 
Size 8,146 1,304 4,192 11,508 
Market-to -Book 1,721 0,962 0,223 7,372 
Tangibility 0,57 0,217 0,08 1,013 
Industry Median Debt 
    
Depreciation 0,043 0,081 -0,6 0,506 
Expected Inflation 0,019 0,02 -0,008 0,038 
R&D Expenditure  0,019 0,044 0 0,312 
No R&D Expenditure 
Reported  [Dummy] 0,553 0,5 0 1 
Firm is Rated 
[Dummy] 0,5 0,501 0 1 
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Appendix B 
 
Content of Enclosed DVD 
 
 
 
There is a DVD enclosed to this thesis which contains empirical data and Gretl source codes. 
• Folder 1: Dataset for leverage testing 
• Folder 2: Dataset and source codes for testing POH 
• Folder 3: Dataset and source codes for testing the STOH 
• Folder 4: Dataset and source codes for testing Conventional model 
 
